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Malaysia, a plural nation comprising of the indigenous Malays (Bumiputeras), 
and the immigrant Chinese and Indians has embarked on a unique program called the 
“New Economic Policy” (NEP) to ensure a fairer share of wealth, income, prosperity and 
opportunities between the ethnic groups. The NEP aimed to promote national unity by 
pursuing the twin objectives of the eradication of poverty and the restructuring of society 
to eliminate identification of race with economic functions. The policy makers planned to 
reduce poverty amongst the entire population, especially the rural poor. They established 
policies to bring the Malays into the mainstream of business, commerce and education 
through redistribution of new, accrual wealth. A powerful Government, compromise and 
continued growth were vital factors to administer the policy. The NEP was an appropriate 
policy for plural Malaysia as it kept the nation prosperous, peaceful and economically 
successful since the 70s whereby Malaysia had enjoyed peace and prosperity with 
average annual growth of nearly 7%. NEP’ s success, current development such as 
globalization, the Asian Crisis and new awareness for transparency and a more liberal 
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In 1971, after a near catastrophic racial riot, Malaysia implemented its “New 
Economic Policy” (NEP), a social reengineering policy. This policy sought to 
fundamentally redistribute the nation’s wealth by bringing the Malays and other 
Bumiputras, the indigenous people of the country, into the main stream of economic life. 
The NEP, by adopting affirmative action programs, was carefully designed to redistribute 
wealth by means of economic growth, and not through the expropriation of wealth 
belonging to other communities.  
This paper attempts to examine whether the “New Economic Policy” is an 
appropriate strategy for Malaysia. In view of recent developments, we seek answers as to 
whether Malaysia should continue with the strategy, and if so, what modifications may be 
necessary. The NEP was a controversial decision, seemingly unfair to the more advanced 
racial groups, as it entailed a restructuring of the society and a redistribution of wealth 
and opportunity in order to achieve unity and stability in favor of the less advanced racial 
groups. In this paper we will outline the historical developments, the compromise made 
to share political and economic powers between the different groups of the population, 
and the arguments behind the government’s active participation and the decision for the 
NEP. We will also discuss how the country should adapt to new expectations after 30 
years of the current policy and realign with the new demands such as globalization.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Most developing countries pursue economic development and industrialization as 
one of their main objectives. The hope is that industrialization will transform poor rural 
farmers into more efficient, better-paid urban industrial workers. Underdevelopment is 
usually associated with problems of poor health, low literacy rates, high mortality rates, 
delinquency, low morale, low self-esteem, feelings of hopelessness and other traits linked 
to poverty, especially in developing and less developed countries. Policies that encourage 
development have brought a better life to people in developing countries as seen from an 
improvement in the development indices of increased household incomes, access to better 
educational facilities, and a decrease in mortality rates to name a few. 
1 
Chasing doggedly after economic growth targets without considering social 
consequences can be detrimental to a country’s sustainable development. For example, 
accelerated growth is desirable, but sometimes may be subordinated to a redistribution of 
income if extreme poverty threatens political stability or forestalls the mobilization of 
human resources.1 In many cases, development policies not qualified with social and 
political considerations have resulted in increased inequalities in wealth, income, and 
opportunities between social, ethnic and religious, or geographical groups. The 
inequalities then spiraled into social tensions, instability, riots and even civil wars2.   
Inequality, or uneven development, manifests itself in many forms such as income 
disparity, spatial distribution of growth, differences in access to education and business 
opportunities, savings rates, and access to affordable and quality healthcare, and other 
forms too numerous to mention.  Persistent inequalities can give rise to social tensions. 
Income differentials, especially if they coincide with racial divisions, can be an explosive 
social mixture. High levels of income inequality are not desirable because they may 
adversely affect growth, promote additional poverty and result in a loss of social 
cohesion3.  
Malaysia is one of the countries that have addressed the issue of unequal 
development. The country has developed a strategy called the “New Economic Policy” 
(NEP) that seeks to strike a balance between the goals of sustained economic growth with 
social and economic equity between racial groups. In the case of Malaysia, it will be 
argued, inequalities have arisen due to concentrations of ethnic-based activities in 
different areas such as agriculture in rural areas amongst the Malays and urban commerce 
with the Chinese and Indians. 
Malaysia, a postcolonial nation, inherited a unique mix of a multi-ethnic, multi-
religious, pluralistic society comprised of three major groups: the Muslim Malays, the 
mainly Buddhist Chinese, Hindu Indians and various other groups. As a result of factors 
                                                 
1 Malcolm Gillis, et al., Economics of Development. (New York: Norton & Company, 1996). p. 15. 
2 This unfortunate situation had happened or continues to haunt many developing nations such as 
Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Peru, Argentina, Russia, China, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Fiji, Indonesia and Malaysia 
to name a few.  
3 Phillipe Aghion, Eve Caroli, and Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, “Inequality and Growth: The Perspective 
of the New Growth Theories”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, December 1999, p. 1630. 
2 
to be discussed later, income and wealth disparity, educational prospects and other 
disparities emerged between these racial groups, which also contributed to a growing 
social and economic chasm. These disparities, plus unresolved racial issues, exploded in 
the form of a bloody communal riot in 1969 that threatened the continued stability and 
the future development of Malaysia. In response to this turmoil, Malaysian political 
leaders developed the New Economic Policy with the objective of promoting national 
unity and stability. The New Economic Policy consisted of the two strategies: to eradicate 
poverty and restructure the society to eliminate the identification of race with economic 
functions as a solution to avoiding further civil disorder. Meanwhile, several new issues 
have emerged which include globalization, a shifting of the political landscape in the 
country, expectations of the new generations, and the Asian economic crisis and its 
aftermath.  
 




C. REASONS FOR THE STUDY 
Malaysia’s New Economic Policy, which resorts to positive discrimination of the 
Bumiputera racial group in order to reduce the economic income gaps between the major 
races for racial harmony and political stability, is a contentious policy issue. It certainly 
goes against the flow of contemporary opinion especially in this era of globalization 
where competitiveness is the buzzword. However, Malaysia has to combine racial equity 
with economic growth in order to remain politically stable and have harmonious relations 
between different ethnic groups. In reference to the controversies, the present Prime 
Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohammad states:  
Malaysia’s NEP was a form of affirmative action, a form which stressed 
the results. Here was an instance where the ends justify the means. Having 
admitted that the distribution of wealth between the races in the country 
was unfair, we were willing to be unfair, in order to achieve fair results 
and the equitable distribution of wealth.4 
We will study the NEP by looking at balanced development through various 
means. The United States of America, for example, tempers development with restraints 
such as anti-trust laws and fair labor laws, equal employment opportunities and 
affirmative action programs and environment protection policies. One of the resolutions 
of the White House Conference on Balanced National Growth and Economic 
Development in July 1978 stated “We believe that economic well being for all will be 
best served by balanced long term economic growth with specific targeted programs for 
the distressed …”5. This statement illustrates the need for development with socio-
economic responsibility or growth with equity. 
The relationship of cultural pluralism to economic inequality in a postcolonial 
society has to be closely examined. Economic progress, political stability, even perhaps 
the survival of many developing countries, largely depends on how well they solve or 
live with the problems of cultural and religious pluralism. Much of the renewed focus on 
inequality is driven by concerns that some groups are being left out of development, that 
                                                 
4 Mahathir Mohammad, The Way Forward, London: Widenfeld and Nicholson.  1998. p. 85. 
5 Balanced National Growth and Economic Development, White Hose Conference, Final Report July 
1978 Washington D.C. Jan 29-Feb 2, 1978. 
4 
globalization and technological change favor those better off and the more skilled 
individuals, and that the rich acquired their wealth unfairly.6 
If the NEP is proven to have worked for the betterment of Malaysia for the past 
thirty years, then it is likely that the policy will be continued in some form. However, 
Malaysia also needs to be aware of new realities, and the necessity to modify the NEP in 
order to balance the desire to maintain the policy of giving economic parity between the 
racial groups in the country and the need to seek competitiveness, maximum efficiency, 
and the confidence of investors.    
The day may come when such delicate balancing may not be necessary at all as 
everyone will have a level playing field and will be content with their share of the 
country’s wealth and prosperity, whatever the race. Malaysians eagerly await that day. 
Until then, their country has to modify the development policies to suit the situation for 
longer-term development, growth and stability.  
In view of the frequent worldwide religious and ethnic conflicts, it is edifying to 
analyze how this policy has managed to contain ethnic strife in a pluralistic Malaysia. 
Malaysia is a good case to study because it has much in common with other significant 
groups in developing countries. The problems and challenges of inter-ethnic relationships 
are not unique to Malaysia alone. The lessons learned and experiences in dealing with 
these issues are applicable to the entire world.  
D. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The study includes looking at the path Malaysia has adopted for balanced 
economic growth and development; its experience and challenges with an economic 
experiment on socio-economic equality that emphasizes the ethnic theme. The emphasis 
is on how a country can reduce inequality and how these efforts affect economic growth.  
Chapter II will discuss development with equality. The reasons that led to 
widening inequality will be examined in Chapter III. Chapter IV will analyze the NEP.  
Chapter V will compare Malaysia’s case with some selected countries that do not have a 
NEP. Chapter VI will conclude the study.    
                                                 
6 Vinod Abuja, et al., Everyone’s Miracles? Revisiting Poverty and Inequality in East Asia. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The premise behind Malaysia’s New Economic Policy is that an economically 
equitable nation will enjoy a more sustainable development and growth.  An equitable 
society, we belief will be more united, stable and resilient, due to reduced jealousy and 
envy among the people involved. The resultant unity will foster political stability and 
contribute to peaceful coexistence, which is vital in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious nation. 
Enduring peace creates the safe haven for governments to build infrastructures and plan 
competitive strategies in order to foster attractive climates for commercial, economic or 
other development activities that promote confidence to attract foreign investors. Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), in turn, further contributes to the economic development of the 
country.  
The focus in this chapter is on the relationship between inequality and 
development, with an emphasis on the pluralistic society. The intent is to establish the 
relationship between inequality and development, and examine strategies countries 
should adopt to maintain the maximum equilibrium. The belief is that pursuing 
development while simultaneously maintaining economic, social and political equality is 
a better model in the long run especially amongst ethnically diverse groups. Disparity, be 
it economic, social or in political power, has created havoc in many developing nations 
such as Zimbabwe, Liberia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, India, 
Tajikistan, Somalia and Nigeria to name a few. Havoc, riots, and civil wars are anathema 
to development and stability. 
Answers to the question whether and how inequality affects growth are very 
important. They lead into the discussions of what policies, if any, governments should 
adopt to ensure continuous growth in their respective countries, and prosperity for their 
citizens. These discussions are especially important now since some believe that 
globalization has replaced the Cold War as the major determinant internationally, that it 
has no role for governments bent on protecting their citizenry from competition, and 
therefore let the fittest survive. Most economists now counsel governments to depend 
7 
substantially on markets to set prices and allocate resources7. However, even a strong 
advocate of globalization, Thomas Friedman (2000), argues that there should be a 
balanced globalization that takes into account the needs of markets, individuals and 
communities8. 
B. INEQUALITY, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT 
The question of the relationship between inequality and the process of economic 
development remains contentious. Does inequality adversely affect development or is it a 
consequence of development, which must be accepted in a free market economy? One 
school of thought states that inequality is good for incentives, and thus good for growth. 
They argue that it is part of a process of change that would ultimately benefit all strata of 
society. Yet there are scholars that argue, “Greater equality in developing countries may 
in fact be a condition for self sustaining growth.”9 These polemics lead to the important 
question of whether equality, especially income and wealth equality, can promote 
stability, higher rates of growth and prosperity in a developing nation. 
1. Inequality Motivating Competition 
Ludwig von Mises (1955), in his work Ideas and Liberty, states that inequality of 
wealth and income is an essential feature in a market economy.10 He describes 
competition in a market economy as a tool that makes the consumer supreme by giving 
them the power to force all those engaged in production to comply with orders, and 
forces those involved in production to do their utmost for the consumers. According to 
him, he who best serves the consumers profits the most and accumulates riches. 
It is true that competition works in a market economy, and competition produces 
inequality as argued by Ludwig Von Moses (1955). However, in our opinion, Ludwig’s 
acceptance of inequality as an inevitable outcome in a market economy is flawed. 
Unequal incomes cause discontent, such as mutinous feelings by peasants towards large 
landowners. In such cases, there is cause for concern and government intervention, such 
as with efforts at redistribution. Even in America, the greatest free market country in the 
                                                 
7 Malcom Gillis, et al, Economics of Development, (New York: Norton and Company), 1996, p. 15.  
8 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, (New York: Random House), 2000, p. 474. 
9 Phillipe Aghion, Eve Carolli, and Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, “Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, Dec 1999, p. 1615. 
10 Ludwig Von Mises, Ideas and Liberty. May 1955.  http://pages.prodigy.com/sovereign/mises.htm 
dated 28 Feb 2002.   
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world, there is a significant amount of redistribution occurring as a result of the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s11. 
2. Equality For Stability 
At least in theory, equality of income and wealth was the centerpiece of socialist 
ideology, and democratic countries too, stress equality.  Gradstein and Milanovic (2000) 
found an inverse relationship between the variables of democracy and income equality,12 
indicating that the more democratic a country, the lower the level of inequality of wealth 
and income. According to them, a poorer individual becomes a decisive voter and will 
choose parties that favor higher redistributive taxes and lower inequality. New 
democratic ideology legitimates a major redistribution of political power that favors the 
majority, which is the disadvantaged element of the society13. This increased political 
inequality has led to more social equality because the major electoral demands made on 
modern political elites has been for a more egalitarian distribution of material goods14. 
Citizens vote for parties appealing to the middle and the working classes.  Therefore, both 
the socialist systems and democratic systems strive to avoid inequality. Only the 
approaches differ, but the intentions are the same.  
Large income inequality exacerbates the vulnerability of populations in 
humanitarian emergencies. Alesina and Perotti’s (1994) study of 71 developing countries 
in 1960-1985 finds that income inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-
political instability as measured by the number of deaths in domestic disturbances and 
assassinations per million population and coups both successful and unsuccessful15. As 
the masses of the poor see their chances of escaping acute poverty diminish, they are 
likely to grow resentful of those whose growing wealth is painfully evident around them. 
Once a population is dissatisfied with income discrepancies and social discrimination, as 
were the majority of nonwhites in white-ruled South Africa, the rising anger that occurs 
when the government fails to reduce poverty and inequality might actually spur a revolt. 
                                                 
11 Bakri Musa, Malay Dilemma Revisited, (San Hose to Excel), 1999, pp. 191-210. 
12  M. Gradstein, and B. Milanovic, Does Liberté = Egalité? A Survey of the Empirical Evidence on 
the Links Between Political Democracy and Income Inequality. Working Paper. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 2000, p. 3. 
13 Ibid, pp. 4-5. 
14 Ibid, p. 5. 
15 Ibid, p. 3. 
9 
Nafizer (2000) states that objective grievances of poverty and inequality contribute to war 
and “humanitarian emergencies”. The risk of political disintegration increases with a 
surge of income disparities by class, region and community.16 
Economic unrest has also emerged in other societies where the gap between the 
rich and the poor has become conspicuously greater.  For example, even prior to the 
Asian Crisis, economic discontent fueled protests and riots in Indonesia, where the rising 
national income failed to improve the lives of millions of low paid factory workers17. 
Similar unrests have been seen in Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and other newly 
industrialized nations.18 
Siddharth Chandra (2002) has studied the causes of anti-Chinese violence in 
Indonesia and concluded that disproportionate gains in wages between the Chinese and 
non-Chinese have been the cause of ethnic violence. She also noted that greater “relative 
deprivation” contributed to higher discontent19. Even an icon of globalization, George 
Soros, has admitted that inequality is stressful.  In an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, he said: “It is generally acknowledged that the gap between the haves and have 
nots is getting wider, and that is a basis for growing disenchantment and stress”20 
Jack Snyder (2000), in his book, From Voting To Violence, describes Sri Lanka’s 
failure to address the disparities in income, wealth and political power between the 
majority Buddhist-Singhalese and the minority Hindu-Tamils as the major cause of its 
ethnic strife and underdevelopment.21 Snyder describes that (though) Malaysia’s 
approach is less democratic after the 1969 riots, enabling it to impose “lopsided 
compromises that discriminated massively in favor of the ethnic Malays in education and 
                                                 
16 Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvien, “Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence” 
in World Development, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 153-163, 2002, http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev dated 
1 March, 2002. 
17 Michael Claire and Yogesh Chandrani, World Security: Challenges for a New Century, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press), 1998. pp. 61-71. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Siddarth Chandra, “Race, Inequality and Anti-Chinese Violence in the Netherlands Indies”, 
Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 39, No. 1, Jan 2002, pp. 88-112. 
20 David Bank,” The Man Who Would Change the World”, Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2002, pp. 
B1. 
21 Jack Snyder, ”Nationalism and Democracy in the Developing World” in From Voting to Violence. 
(Washington: Norton and Company, Inc. 2000). 
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state employment”, it also creates “a favorable economic conditions for Chinese owned 
private enterprise”. In contrast, various Sri Lankan governments were beholden to the 
Singhalese majority only.  Malaysia had used the cross ethnic power sharing alliance, 
whereas in Sri Lanka, the government had to rely on the powerful and partisan Buddhist 
monks in the villages to appeal to the majority of the rural Singhalese. Snyder has also 
advised that Malaysia should use the successful economy to transition to more cross 
cutting in cultural, economic, class, and gender areas that may reduce the significant 
Malay-Chinese split. 
Snyder’s article has indicated that reducing inequality is a delicate process of 
trade-offs, even by truncating democracy. Nevertheless, equality is essential to economic 
growth, peace, stability and prosperity. He described Malaysia’s attempts as a trade-off 
between sharing political power between the Malays with the Chinese, and the policies of 
positive discrimination for the Malays in government employment and education as 
contributing to a better situation in Malaysia than in Sri Lanka. 
3. Causes of Inequality 
After three decades in which rapid growth and reduced inequality have been the 
defining characteristics of what has become known as the East Asia economic miracle, 
there is growing evidence that inequality is beginning to appear again in some of the 
region’s economies.  Recent figures have shown that in China, Hong Kong, Thailand and 
the Philippines, inequalities are on the increase. Only in Malaysia, from 1973-1989, has 







                                                 
22 Vinod Ahuja, Beru Bidani, Francisco Fereira et al Everyone’s a Miracle? Revisiting Poverty and 
Inequality in East Asia. (Washington: The World Bank) 1999, pp. 25-31. 
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Economy    Period Measured Variable
Gini Coefficient23 
1st Yr       Last Yr 
Hong Kong    71-91 Income/household 40.9          45.0 
Singapore      73-89 Income/household 41.0          39.0 
China             85-95 Income/capita 29.9          38.8 
Philippines     85-94 Expenditure/capita 41.0          42.9 
Thailand         75-92 Expenditure/capita 36.4           46.2 
Malaysia        73-89 Income/capita 50.1           45.9 
Indonesia       70-95 Expenditure/capita 34.9           34.2 
 
Table 1.   Inequality in East Asia. 
(From: World Bank Report) 
 
Ahuja, et al. suggest that two basic mechanisms are at play in the increase of 
income inequality in East Asia:24 
• Higher education opportunities have increased the wedge between skilled 
and unskilled labor. Higher education begets higher wages 
• Spatial disparity in economic prosperity stemming from a concentration of 
economic activity in certain areas to the exclusion of others. 
There are three basic reasons why inequality is undesirable: 
• Inequality tends to lessen poverty reduction efforts. As the income wedge 
gets greater, more resources are needed in order for the relatively poorer 
section to catch up. This puts a damper on efforts to catch up.  
• Individuals in society may place an intrinsic value on equality and a sense 
of social cohesion arises from it. If the inequality gap is not addressed, 
there will be social discontent.  
• May hamper growth, as a policy on redistribution may be needed to allow 





                                                 
23 In this thesis the term inequality is used to mean differences in income and wealth, measured from 
the differences  in household incomes and corporate wealth ownership across racial lines. The Gini 
coefficient is a measure of the equality on a scale of 1 to 0, where 0 represents uniform equality and 1 
represents total inequality. 
24 Ahuja, et al., (1999) 
12 
4. Development and Growth25 
Growth can be an antidote for misery and poverty. Growth, or the absence 
thereof, affects the material well being of 4.5 billion citizens of developing countries. 
Without growth, people can only become better off by transfers of income and assets 
from others. However, at times, growth can be pursued for the wrong reasons. 
Governments are known to pursue development and growth to augment power and glory 
of the state and its rulers such as by buying unnecessary weaponry or pursuing egomania 
development projects. Others heavily invest resources for further growth without much 
immediate gain for the poor. The incomes and consumption of nations can increase, yet 
the benefits are mostly distributed to the already relatively well off26. This course of 
action will, obviously, set off inequalities and social discontent as discussed earlier. 
Policies for growth must also be rational and generate the maximum cost-benefit for the 
country, yet must be sensitive enough not to leave any group behind in the development 
process.  Judicious concentration of efforts and resource allocation is very pertinent if 
nations are to obtain the maximum benefit. 
According to Gould and Raffin (1993), variables that encourage growth are 
schooling, educational investment, capital savings, investment in equipment and human 
resources, whilst variables that discourage growth are government consumption 
spending, political and social instability, trade barriers and socialism27. Thus, 
governments and policy makers should intervene in the economy to adopt policies that 
promote growth, and refrain from falling into the areas that cause a reduction in growth. 
The NEP of Malaysia has tried to follow this course of action by promoting growth-
inducing policies and thereby prevents instability. 
Gillis, et al., (1996) argue that nations can concentrate on balanced growth by 
developing all aspects of an industry such as mining, agriculture and industrialization, 
and on unbalanced growth such as import substitution, or entertain an all out export 
strategy28. They also advocate that material growth must have a close relationship with 
                                                 
25 Though they are quite different, this paper treats them as interchangeable. 
26 Cit, p. 69. 
27 Gould and Raffin, “What Determines Economic Growth?”, Economic Review, 2nd Quarter, 1993. 
28 Gillis, et al, pp. 63-65. 
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human welfare and development, and issues of inequality and poverty must also be 
addressed. This is in accordance with Malaysia’s policies of expanding the economic pie, 
whilst restructuring the society. The twin objectives of the NEP were:29 
• Eradication of poverty irrespective of race 
• The elimination of the identification of race with economic function 
C. WHAT STRATEGY SHOULD BE ADOPTED? 
It is obvious that countries need growth and development to progress. Balanced 
growth and development is an indisputable way to eradicate poverty.  Economic growth 
enables some or even all people to become better off, without anyone necessarily 
becoming worse off. Nevertheless, economic growth alone is not a sufficient condition 
for improving mass living standards, as distribution of income is also important30. The 
preceding discussions point to the need for a balance in development, especially for the 
need of equitable development or growth.  
It is our belief that governments should pursue a balanced and equitable growth. 
For countries that are ethnically and religiously divided, equality, especially in income 
and wealth, should be of concern if it crosses ethnic and religious lines. Governments 
should be striking an optimum balance between the goals of economic growth and equity; 
ensuring a balanced development of the major sectors of the economy, reducing and 
ultimately eliminating the social, economic and regional inequalities and imbalances, and 
ensuring material welfare while instilling positive social and spiritual values.  
Policy makers should also give priority to human resource development; making 
science and technology an integral component of development planning; and ensuring the 
protection of the environment to maintain the long-term sustainability of the country’s 
development. Klause Deininger and Pedro Olinto in a World Bank report recommended 
that human capital should be made a growth-enhancing asset, supporting the emphasis of 
policy makers on education as one instrument to overcome inequality. They also 
recommend innovative programs to foster the acquisition of productive assets to help the 
poorer segments to utilize labor in more productive ways31. 
                                                 
29 Mahathir Mohammad, (1999) p. 9. 
30 Malcom Gillis, et al, Economics of Development, (New York: Norton and Company), 1996, p. 68. 
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31 Klause Deininger and Pedro Olinto, “Asset Distribution, Inequality, and Growth”, World Bank 
Report. 
The question of the intervention of the government in this age of globalization 
still exists. Globalization is a new phenomenon to be reckoned with. Thomas Friedman 
(2000) in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree advises nations to take heed of the 
forces of globalization that have no boundaries and cannot be stopped from entering the 
country. If a country tries to prevent this new force, it will be left behind in the economic 
development due to a lack of foreign direct investments and capital inflows. The author 
calls for competitive policies and transparency to foster investors’ confidence. A policy 
of redistribution must take these factors into consideration in planning.  
The author is correct that, as in a globalized world, investors want to go where 
costs are lowest and seize the chance to make maximum profit. A redistribution policy 
must not make Malaysia’s costs higher. While redistributing wealth and income, 
Malaysia has to improve its productivity and become more cost effective. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Growth and development are desirous, as they can eradicate poverty and improve 
the standard of living in developing nations. However, uncontrolled growth and 
economic development, if left to the total mercy of market forces, tend to be 
disadvantageous to the already weaker groups in a nation. This situation will develop into 
disparities and inequalities in wealth and income between the various groups. If the rift is 
across racial and religious lines, the situation can cause instability and escalate into riots 
and civil war, which is detrimental to further growth. Inequality or disparity in income, 
wealth or political power is the major cause of conflicts in the developing world.  When 
this happens, economic growth will suffer and lead to more problems for the country. 
Thus, governments are advised to adopt policies that provide growth with equality. 
We believe that government policies must address the issue of reversing 
inequality. Strategies such as reducing poverty, redistributing wealth, taking affirmative 
actions, and having access to higher education are just some of the strategies.  Attempts 
to reduce imbalances can make an economy less efficient in the allocation of resources, 
and can hinder the competitiveness of a country. However, judicious policies that strive 
to develop whilst maintaining equality amongst the population are more sustainable in the 
long term as they provide political and social stability. Stability will in turn encourage 
further economic growth.  
15 
Efforts to narrow the gap will help nations develop and become more peaceful 
and prosperous. However, the country cannot perpetuate this redistribution policy 
forever, as the measures are a hindrance to competitiveness, which is very much needed 
in this era of globalization. At most, it should be used as a respite to give the stragglers 
time to catch up, and then the country should move forward towards sustained growth 




III. HISTORY OF MODERN MALAYSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces events from the founding of the Malay Sultanate to modern 
day Malaysia. It is a chronicle of the development of the Malaysian people, namely the 
Malays, Chinese, Indians and other ethnicities that compose the multi-racial and 
pluralistic Malaysia. For the Chinese and Indians, it is a history of having to adapt to a 
new homeland. For the Malays, it is a history of being colonized by the Western powers 
of Portugal, Holland and Britain and having to learn to adopt the policies imposed upon 
them. The Japanese occupation taught them that an Asian people could also defy the 
mighty British, and had germinated the awareness that they would be able to control their 
own destiny one day through self-governance. 
The Malays had no choice but to resign the fate of their nation to the British who 
brought in the Chinese and the Indians to exploit the country’s resources. Eventually, the 
Malays were forced to take in these immigrants as equal citizens as a prerequisite for 
independence.32 However, they adjusted, and were willing to share political power for an 
equal share of the nation’s economic prosperity.33  Snodgrass (1980) describes the onset 
of independent Malaya as “…the beginning of a political system in which Malays, 
Indians and Chinese representatives in a permanent coalition aimed at resolving conflicts 
of group interests through elite bargaining.”34 
B.  THE EARLY DAYS 
The written history of Malaysia began in 1405 with the founding of Malacca by a 
Hindu prince from Sumatra. He then embraced Islam and started the Malacca Sultanate, 
which evolved into various other Muslim Malay Sultanates in the states of the Malay 
Archipelago after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese and then to the Dutch.  
After Malacca was captured, the new Muslim trading centers flourished in Johore 
and later in Perak. Both the Minangkabau immigrants from Sumatra and the Bugis from 
                                                 
32 Mahathir Mohammad, The Way Forward, (London: Weinfield and Nicholson 1999), p. 3. 
33 Ibid. p. 8. 
34 Donald Snodgrass, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
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Celebes immigrated to the peninsula in large numbers leaving lasting cultural influences. 
In the late 1860's, a number of Malay kingdoms began fighting each other for control of 
the throne of Perak causing enough of a disturbance in the region to inspire Britain to 
intervene and essentially force the Malay rulers to sign a peace treaty known as the 
Pangkor Agreement in 1874. The treaty, unsurprisingly, gave Britain a much greater role 
in the region, which it would need in order to maintain its monopoly on the vast amount 
of tin being mined in the peninsula35. 
C. BRITISH RULE 
Though various colonial powers had ruled Malaysia36, it was the British who 
were the most influential in latter day Malaysia. Under British rule, nine Malay states 
combined and formed the Federation of Malay States together with Malacca, Singapore 
and Penang. These states evolved into the Federation of Malaya, and in 1963, Malaysia. 
British administrators changed Malaysia’s racial composition forever by transplanting 
large numbers of Chinese and Indians from their homeland into Malaysia, and forcing the 
local Malays to accept and live with the immigrants as equal citizens. Their divide and 
rule policy resulted in uneven economic, educational and social developments much 
favorable to the former immigrants and started the stereotyping of ethnicity with 
economic activity. These initial disparities later perpetuated into race relations problems 
in Malaysia.  
The British role on the Malaysian peninsula began in 1786, when Francis Light of 
the British East India Company, while searching for a site for trade and a naval base, 
obtained the cession of the island of Penang from the Sultan of Kedah. In 1791, the 
British agreed to make annual payments to the Sultan, and in 1800, the latter ceded 
Province Wellesley on the mainland. In 1819, the British founded Singapore and in 1824, 
they formally acquired Malacca from the Dutch but actual control had been exercised 
since 1795. A joint administration was formed for Penang, Malacca and Singapore, 
which became known as the Straits Settlements.37 
                                                 
35 Colonial Malaysia AD 1400-1957, http://www.geographia.com/malaysia/history04.htm, dated 8 
April 2002. 
36 The Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, the Dutch took over in 1641, and the Japanese in 1942. 
The English exchanged Malacca for Batawi in Indonesia in 1795. 
37 Foreign Influence HTTP://WWW.INFOPLEASE.COM/CE6/WORLD/A0859448.HTML, dated 8 
April 2002. 
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Newly discovered veins of tin deposits eventually led to British control of the 
Malay States. Fighting over the thrones and control of the tin revenues, the Malay rulers 
sought help from the Chinese secret society clansmen and the British. Eventually, the 
British intervened in all Malay States to “keep law and order”, or to prevent other 
colonial powers such as the Germans from peddling their influence38. During 1878-88, 
the British entered into agreements with the Sultans of Perak, Pahang, Selangor and the 
Ruler of Negeri Sembilan to provide British Resident Advisors on all matters except 
Malay customs and the Muslim religion.39  These states then formed the Federated Malay 
States (FMS) in 1896. By 1914, five more states, Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and 
Trengganu, were forced to accept Resident British Advisors and the Unfederated Malay 
States was formed. These nine states, together with Malacca and Penang of the Straits 
Settlements later formed the Federation of Malaya in 1948. 
Naturally, British companies managed the tin mines and established rubber 
plantations. These were premium commodities from the late 1800s until the 1960s. Since 
the local Malay population was neither large nor interested in working in the tin mines or 
on the rubber estates, migrant workers from China and India were brought to Malaya. 
From 1786-1947, a large number of workers from China and India immigrated, and to a 
lesser extent from Indonesia40. Some groups of Indians were brought in from India and 
Ceylon as colonial public service officers due to their greater competence in English and 
their familiarity with the British administrative system in India41. Thus, a large portion of 
civil service, such as the Public Works Department, the railways or technical services 
were dominated by the Indians in the early days. Most of the Chinese worked in the tin 
mines and the majority of the Indians in the rubber industry42.  
The rubber and tin mining industries spawned urban townships where the Chinese 
and Indians settled. Much to their merit, the early immigrants worked very hard and were 
tenacious. They endured hard labor and harsh conditions to live spartanly on the estates, 
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the kongsi or clansmen dormitories. Others, however, had access to education and were 
involved in commerce established by British administrators. British import and export 
houses needed intermediaries to trade with the rural population and the commercially–
minded Chinese immigrants were quick to seize the opportunity43. The emphasis on 
Chinese enterprise at that time was a common feature in Southeast Asia then. Under 
colonial rule, the Chinese were merchants, tax collectors and operators of trading 
monopolies. This provided the springboard for the Chinese in Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia to become the driving force behind capitalist development.44   
The indigenous Malays farmed their rural lands and mostly involved themselves 
in agriculture and fishing. Malay access to many important forms of employment, such as 
professional, administrative and clerical, was largely a function of education. Colonial 
policy quite explicitly held the Malays back from the types of education that would 
provide such access45. Colonial fears of the political effects of widespread proficiency in 
English on the urban oriented education for Malays were often explicit in official 
pronouncements of the times46. Education in Malay was rural in its orientation, aiming 
“to make the son of a fisherman or peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than 
his father had been, and a man whose education will enable him to understand how his 
own lot fits in with the scheme of life around him”47 
The Malays posed no competitive economic threat to European economic 
interests but because their political legitimacy in Malaya was never directly challenged, 
they were, by far, the greatest political threat. This fact does seem to provide at least a 
partial explanation for official policies that limited Malay economic opportunities.48 On 
the other hand, both the will and ability to make more sophisticated and far reaching 
adjustments to changes for opportunity readjustment which required changes in living 
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conditions and life styles do seem to have been weak, especially when compared to the 
impressive ability of the Chinese in these matters.49.  
The British left the Malays to tend their padi-fields, put the Indians in the fledging 
civil service and encouraged the Chinese to dabble in commerce. Thus, amid the neglect 
of the Malays and paternalism of the colonial masters, the Chinese businessmen 
prospered.50 It was to be the beginning of a situation where economic activity was 
identifiable by ethnicity, and income inequality widened amongst the ethnic groups. 
D. JAPANESE OCCUPATION 
British rule was interrupted for four years during World War II when the Japanese 
occupied Malaysia from 1941-1945. The Japanese occupation was a period of deprivation 
in which inter-group relations worsened under the strain of sharply differing treatments 
by the Japanese occupation forces. China and Japan had been at war since 1934, and 
therefore, the Chinese in Malaya received the harshest treatment and provided practically 
all the underground opposition51. Being bitter enemies of the Japanese, a number of 
Chinese men formed a resistance guerrilla group called the Malayan Peoples’ Anti 
Japanese Army (MPAJA) with ties to the Chinese Communists. By contrast, the Malays 
and Indian accepted the occupation with more equanimity and in many cases actively 
cooperated with the Japanese.  
E. THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY INSURGENCIES 
Japan’s surrender in 1945 before the arrival of the British reoccupation forces was 
followed by a brief period of chaos. The MPAJA guerillas saw the opportunity to seize 
power in Peninsular Malaysia. This further exacerbated the ethnic tensions when wartime 
scores were settled and Chinese guerilla forces temporarily seized control of some small 
towns52. In the process, this movement, consisting mostly of the Chinese “freedom 
fighters”, had also committed acts of atrocities against the Malay villagers and soldiers. 
The Malays retaliated in kind and became even more anti-Chinese in the immediate years 
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that followed53. This period ended with the arrival of the British reoccupation forces in 
the form of the British Military Administration (BMA) a few months later.  
F. INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL CONTRACT OF 1957 
Immediately after the war, the British returned with a scheme to form the 
“Malayan Union” that proposed placing all nine Malay states and Penang and Malacca 
under one government. Singapore was to be designated a separate state. The Malays, 
however, vehemently opposed the plan by denouncing it as a British ploy to abolish the 
Malay Sultanate. They also objected to the Union’s goal of providing citizenship with 
equal political rights to all Malayans, irrespective of race.54 In May 1946, the Malays 
formed the political party called the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 
whose purpose was to object to the formation of the Malayan Union. 
The Malayan Union was abandoned and by 1948 the British had decided to grant 
self-government to the Federation of Malaya, and worked to find a consensus among the 
various ethnic groups. The negotiations among the various groups resulted in a 
compromise whereby the Malays retained political power, and in exchange, allowed the 
Chinese to continue their economic functions with the understanding that in time more 
equality would be achieved among the races both economically and politically55.  There 
was a social contract that stipulated that the acceptance of the immigrants as citizens and 
the right to participate in the political process be a trade off with them agreeing to the use 
of the Malay language, special privileges for the Malays and their broader economic 
participation56.   
According to Snodgrass (1980), the essence of the compromise of the “Bargain of 
1957” was that the Malays made substantial concessions with respect to citizenship, 
while the non-Malays recognized the special rights of the Malays without any time 
limits57. The Malays feared being overrun by the non-Malay citizens and losing their 
political hegemony, which they saw as a counterbalance to the economic strength of the 
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Chinese58. In return for granting the “immigrants” the right to become citizens and tacitly 
accepting their dominance economically, the Malays were given control politically.  
Hence, the demand for the recognition of their special position as an indigenous people of 
the country and measures to accelerate socio-economic progress competitively with the 
more aggressive immigrants.  
In response to accepting the citizenship issue, the Malays received certain tangible 
and non-tangible benefits. Article 153 of the new Constitution stated that “it shall be the 
responsibility of the (King) to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the 
legitimate interests of other communities…” These included employment quotas in 
public services, scholarships, business permits and licenses and (in Article 89), the 
reservation of certain lands for the exclusive right of the Malays.59  Malay was 
designated the national language but the private use of other languages was specifically 
guaranteed. Thus, the Malay privileged status as the Bumiputera (the sons of the soil) is 
protected by the Constitution60. 
It is obvious that the positions of the Malays, Chinese and the Indians differed 
greatly when independence was declared. Economically, the Chinese and the Indians 
were by far in the strongest position, not only because they had amassed relatively large 
amounts of wealth, were very educated and experienced but also because they 
demonstrated the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities. In the 
political arena, however, the Malays had already seized the initiative because of their 
historical advantage of legitimacy and their earlier development of nationalism that 
focused on Malaya. The Chinese and Indians had earlier regarded their stay in Malaya as 
temporary as they were to return home to China or India after accumulating enough 
savings, and regarded Malaya as a place of transition rather than as their new 
homeland.61 Through their preoccupation with the fast-moving affairs in their homelands, 
the Chinese and Indians bungled whatever chance they had for a major political say in 
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post-war Malaya. When they finally decided to opt for Malaya, it was too late to obtain 
anything more than something along the lines of a junior partner’s role.62   
By August 1957, the Malayan Federation achieved independence. Singapore was 
also to be given self-rule as a separate nation. In Malaya, a new Constitution also 
embraced the provisions for granting the Chinese and Indian immigrants citizenship 
either by birth or by fulfilling the requirements for residency. An additional one million 
non-Malays were given full citizenship in a country of only five million people63.  The 
census in 1953 put the Malayan population at 5.7 million64. See Table 2. This is 
significant because in the 1955 election, the Malays comprised 84 percent of the 
electorate, whereas in the 1959 election, they comprised only 57 percent65. 
However, members of the Malayan Communist Party (CPM) regarded the 
restrictive requirements of citizenship and compromise as a betrayal of their loyalty to the 
British during the Japanese occupation66 and launched the same guerilla warfare that they 
had once deployed against the Japanese67. The Malayan Government had to declare a 
state of emergency from 1948-1960. The ongoing insurrection was by Chinese 
Communists bent on making the Malay Peninsula a Chinese-dominated communist 
state68. Other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam were also undergoing the pro-
communist struggle and were well supported by the local population. In Malaysia, the 
CPM, though receiving Chinese sympathy, did not receive much support from the Malays 
and finally negotiated for peace in 1989.  
G. POWER-SHARING  
The preceding events, from the perspective of the Malays, put into doubt the 
loyalty of the immigrants. Yet, despite their distrust due to the perceived disloyalty of the 
Chinese and Indians towards the Malayan Federation, the Malays nevertheless were 
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prodded into accepting them and sharing political power with them.  The colonial 
government had made it a condition that independence would only be granted to a multi-
ethnic leadership69.  Thus, a political alliance calling itself the Alliance Party, led by 
UMNO leader Tunku Abdul Rahman (later was elected as Malaysia’s first Prime 
Minister) was created in 1955 comprising the United Malays National Organization party 
of the Malays (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association party (MCA) and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) to form the Malayan Government. It was synergic 
relationship, too as UMNO, which consisted of poor Malays, was also heavily dependent 
on the wealthy MCA for financial support, while the MCA needed the UMNO to win 
seats in elections because, although the Malays comprised only 49 percent of the 
population in 1955, they made up 80 percent of the electorate.  
Again, after the 1969 riots, the Malaysian power-sharing concept was expanded to 
accommodate a coalition called the National Front (led by Tun Abdul Razak who 
succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman) consisting of 10 other parties that were mostly non-
Malay based. Three major non-Malay political parties, the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and the Gerakan Party, an 
erstwhile opposition party prior to 1969, represented Chinese and Indians interests. Two 
East Malaysia based parties represented the interests of non-Muslim Bumiputeras from 
Sabah and Sarawak. The Gerakan was a Chinese and Indian based political party with a 
few Malay supporters. Chinese and Indian political leaders were given prominent 
ministries to lead.70  Again, there were trade offs between the races akin to the social 
contract at the onset of independence. The Malays could have ruled Malaysia alone as a 
Malay coalition government with the Islamic Party (PAS) as they had the majority seats 
in the Parliament. Despite different interests, the three major races managed to work 
together to share political power to rule the nation. 
H. MALAY AND NON-MALAY FEARS AND DISSENT 
Not all citizens agreed with the political and economic compromises of 1957. 
Although the Chinese business community supported the power-sharing formula by 
participating in the Government through MCA via the coalition Alliance Party, many 
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others disagreed.  The opposition political parties took the opportunity to encourage these 
dissidents. Amongst the forefront of these opposition parties was the People’s Action 
Party (PAP) headed by Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore71. He led the challenge against the 
MCA for the Chinese support. PAP did not subscribe to the concept of the Malay 
political hegemony and Malay special rights in Malaysia72. Their battle cry was 
“Malaysian Malaysia”-----equal rights for all citizens based entirely on meritocracy with 
no discrimination amongst the races. PAP also championed the right for the existence of 
Chinese schools and retaining the Chinese language and culture.  It was an explicit attack 
on Malay special rights. This political challenge from Singapore only served as a catalyst 
to increase Malay awareness of the forced compromise with the non-Malay community 
as represented by the MCA and MIC73.  In fact, Lee Kuan Yew’s approach was very 
inflammatory and caused Malay-Chinese racial riots in Singapore in July 196474. 
However, Lee claimed that the riots were instigated by “Malay Ultras” in UMNO as a 
weapon to discredit his struggle.75  
When Singapore was asked to leave the Malaysia Federation over these issues and 
many fundamental disagreements on 9 August 196576, the Chinese and Indian opposition 
dissenters were championed by new opposition political parties, namely the Gerakan 
Party, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) formed in early 1969. A portion of the 
Malays who did not approve of the power sharing discussions for independence had 
already formed an opposition party called the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP), better 
known latter by the acronym PAS on 24 November 195177. This Muslim theocratic party 
wanted to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state, and did not approve of non-Muslims in the 
government.  
The attitude of the People’s Republic of China towards overseas Chinese 
aggravated the suspicions of the Malays concerning Chinese loyalty to Malaya.  
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According to Lee Kuan Yew (2000), now the Singapore Senior Minister in his book 
From Third World to First: 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) aimed to increase the loyalty of the 
overseas Chinese to Beijing. In 1949 it formed the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission. It supported the Chinese education overseas and 
encouraged the Nanyang (Southeast Asian) Chinese to send home 
remittances for their relatives. It appealed to (qualified Chinese) to rebuild 
the Motherland. It was a subversive challenge to the newly independent 
governments of Southeast Asia78. 
I. POST INDEPENDENCE 
The most salient feature of Malaysian politics since independence is the 
maintenance of a precarious balance between the conflicting interests of the Malay 
majority and the Chinese and Indian minorities, and particularly the Chinese. The tacit 
agreement after independence between the Malay and Chinese leaders was that politics 
and economics were to be kept separate with the Malays dominating the former and the 
Chinese the latter.  
However, this agreement proved less than satisfactory to the majority of Malays 
as Chinese wealth brought with it political clout as the income gap between the Malay 
masses and the Chinese and Indians widened. The Indians and the Chinese had worked 
their way into an economically advantaged position while the majority of the Malays 
remained in their traditional occupations of subsistence farming and fishing79. The 
economic policy after independence up to 1970 was basically laissez-faire and this suited 
the Chinese, Indians and foreign interests. Meanwhile, the ever-resourceful wealthy 
Chinese businessmen also allied themselves with the politically powerful traditional 
Malay aristocrats who monopolized government positions despite ethnic rivalries.80 
Some of these arrangements were later to result in a new form of business-political 
cronyism and thereby causing rifts in intra-Malay relations. These developments further 
increased the wealth and income gaps between the Malays and non-Malays and a great 
deal of latent dissatisfaction festered. 
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From independence to the late 1960s, the government was preoccupied with 
defense, internal security and before August 1965, Lee Kuan Yew’s attempt to gain 
power in Malaysia, as well as the need to adjust to Singapore’s expulsion from the 
Federation. Economic growth was to be achieved by a liberal economic policy that 
assigned the development of mining, industry and much of commercial agriculture to the 
private sector, which was overwhelmingly foreign and ethnic Chinese in its ownership 
and management. The government was cast as a rather passive facilitator of such 
development as well as a more active promoter of rural development, which was intended 
to improve the lot of the predominantly rural ethnic Malay.81  
The major events occurring in 1960s were the formation of Malaysia, the 
Indonesian confrontation and riots, and the NEP. The states of Sarawak and Sabah in East 
Borneo, and Singapore joined the Federation to form Malaysia. The political position of 
the Malays worsened as the population of Singapore was 75 percent Chinese, Sabah and 
Sarawak had a large population of non-Muslim indigenous people, and the Malay- 
majority Brunei had opted not to join Malaysia at the last minute.  However, as stated 
earlier, Singapore was asked to leave in 1965 over policy differences such as the special 
rights of the Malays, Chinese education and culture and other fundamental racial issues82. 
Singapore’s departure also helped to decrease the non-Malay percentage of the 
population in Malaysia. 
Indonesia, under President Sukarno, objected to the formation of Malaysia and 
launched the “Konfrantasi” from 1963 until 1966. The Indonesian confrontation had 
given Malaysian race relations a short respite with people of all races were united for the 
time being by a common enemy.83 
J. COMMUNAL RIOTS 
Political developments in Malaysia are primarily driven by ethnic tensions and 
compromises. The Malay-Chinese racial conflict, never far beneath the surface, was 
exacerbated by an official colonial policy of importing the Chinese, and to a lesser extent 
the Indians, to develop, under British tutelage, the country that nominally belonged to the 
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Malays.84 The compromise generated between the coalition partners (the Alliance Party) 
on the eve of independence failed to fulfill the growing expectations of the younger 
generations. The new generations of Malays, fearing their country was to be dominated 
by the Chinese especially economically, as had happened in Singapore85, wanted more 
and faster economic gains, whilst the non-Malays were unhappy with their lack of 
political control. 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister of Malaysia, and his apathetic attitude 
in race relations and his compromises were causing distrust and uncertainty among 
people of all races86.  The Malays continued to lose faith in Tunku Abdul Rahman’s87 
leadership, as he was perceived to be too conceding to non-Malays88.  Malay “young 
Turks” especially disagreed with his stand of “Let the Chinese be traders and Malays be 
politicians”.89   
The Chinese felt that they were not being given equal treatment, while the Malays 
felt that they had already conceded too much and stood to lose all.90  “The Malaysian 
Malaysia” concept as introduced by Lee Kuan Yew had deeply wounded the Malays as 
well as accentuated the resentment of the Chinese. Thus, it was not surprising that racial 
relations were in a state of disharmony and at times clashes erupted in the country with 
the potential to destabilize the young nation. It was a potential time bomb, ticking away, 
with increasing tension. 
An early post-independence Malay-Chinese communal riot occurred in July 1964 
in Singapore, which was at that time a part of Malaysia, after Lee Kuan Yew’s party, the 
PAP, had demanded the “Malaysian Malaysia” concept91. Five people were killed in this 
riot.  
                                                 
84 M. G. Pillai, Shotgun Wedding Paves The Way for Economic Success 
http://www.worldpaper.com/Archivewp/1996/Sept96/pillai.html dated 8 April 2002. 
85 Singapore was a former Malaysia territory taken over by the British. The population is about 75% 
Chinese compared to 14% Malay. 
86 Zainuddin Maidin, p. 17. 
87 The first Prime Minster after independence was the main architect of the racial compromise. 
88 Zainuddin Maidin, (2000) p. 17. 
89 Ibid. p. 14. 
90 Chowdhury, p. 46. 
91 Lee Kuan Yew,  (2000) p. xiv. 
29 
The most damaging chaos, and one that shaped Malaysia’s subsequent economic 
and political policies, however, happened on 13 May 1969. In the general elections of 10 
May 1969, the Alliance Party coalition of the three ethnic groups of the Malays, Chinese 
and Indians fared poorly. Though they had won the Parliamentary elections, albeit by a 
reduced majority, they lost the two states of Kelantan to the PAS Party and Penang to the 
Gerakan Party. Communal tensions ran high as the results were perceived in some 
quarters as reflecting a decrease in UMNO, and hence, Malay political hegemony92.   
The Alliance Party lost 22 seats in Parliament. UMNO had a net loss of seven; the 
MIC one seat and the MCA suffered the worst with a loss of 14 seats of the 27 it 
contested.93  The implication was the apparent withdrawal of the Chinese support for the 
MCA and the Malays concluded that the Chinese were repudiating the “Bargain of 1957” 
and directly challenging Malay political control. It was frightening to the Malays as their 
economic backwardness had not been overcome while awareness of the economic 
disparities and determination to do something had increased94. The announcement by the 
MCA leader, Tun Tan Siew Sin that the MCA would withdraw from the Cabinet, 
although it would continue to support the Alliance in Parliament, had seemed to confirm 
the impression that the power-sharing formula of inter-ethnics politics was finished. 
The opposition parties considered the poor performance of the Alliance to be a 
major victory. The Chinese opposition parties in particular went further and celebrated 
what they declared was a Chinese victory over the Malays. The riots’ countdown began 
when the competing political party workers were permitted to hold victory celebration 
parades in Kuala Lumpur, during which they deliberately taunted each other. The racial 
riots of 13 May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur95 were triggered by the perception of the Chinese 
opposition parties’ culturally offensive behavior and insults at their subsequent “victory 
celebration” and UMNO’s angry “victory procession” in response. The official casualty 
figures were 143 Chinese, 25 Malays, 13 Indians, and 15 others killed and 439 
wounded.96 
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As a result of the May 1969 riots, the Malaysian King proclaimed a state of 
emergency and suspended the Parliament. Democracy was cut short. The country was to 
be administered by the National Operations Council (NOC) chaired by Deputy Premier 
Tun Abdul Razak, to govern by decree to restore law and order.97  Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
the Prime Minister who was perceived to be too accommodating to the non-Malays, was 
no longer in charge and ignored. It was a “palace coup” amongst the Malays. 
The recession of 1987 had precipitate a near disaster with the potential for another 
bloody racial riot. The government avoided it with strong measures. Rumors of Malays 
running amok due to the deteriorating economy brought widespread panic, escalated 
racial tensions and chaos in Kuala Lumpur. The nation was brought to the brink of 
another series of racial riots. Emotional speeches by political leaders worsened the 
situation. However, swift action by the police who had to resort to using the Internal 
Security Act (ISA), which allowed detention without a trial, kept the situation under 
control. In the subsequent “Operation Lalang” about 106 people were arrested. Sixty 
were later released and forty-six were detained for up to two years. According to the 
White Paper explaining the arrests, various groups who had played up "sensitive issues" 
and thus created "racial tension" in the country had exploited the government's liberal and 
tolerant attitude. According to the official explanation, this racial tension made the arrests 
necessary and forced the government to act “swiftly and firmly” to contain the 
situation98.  
Towards the end of the economic crisis of 1997-1998, a Hindu-Malay fight 
erupted in a place called Kampong Medan in Kuala Lumpur in 2001. Though the reasons 
sparking the riots were trivial, a petty abusive act of a drunkard, the underlying factors 
were again economic and social dissatisfaction along racial lines in an economically 
depressed atmosphere. Six people died in this riot on March 4, 200199. Poor living 
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conditions and uneven developments of the Malays and Indians living in the community 
had increased tensions and encouraged the riots.100 
K. FORMATION OF A NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
While the immediate cause of the May 1969 riots was political, Malaysian leaders 
concluded that the root cause was economics. Chinese leaders concluded that the 1969 
riots were due to insufficient private investment and economic growth, as there had been 
a recession in 1967-1968 that the Alliance government did little to counter. The Malay 
view was that the riots resulted from “economic imbalances” not only in income but also 
in employment patterns and in the ownership and control of wealth101. It was this view 
that eventually became the official policy. 
Tun Abdul Razak created the National Consultative Council (NCC) with 
representatives drawn from the major races to formulate a new economic policy to 
restructure the economy so that a more equitable distribution of wealth could be achieved 
between the races. The emphasis would be to bring the Malays and other Bumiputeras 
into the mainstream economically. The idea was to enrich them without impoverishing 
the other races and without expropriating their existing wealth. It was hoped that the 
outcome of the New Economic Policy (NEP), as it was called, would be to foster national 
unity by eradicating poverty amongst the races and restructuring society by eliminating 
the identification of occupation by race.  
As finally announced, the policy obligated the government to work for the virtual 
elimination of all “economic imbalances” over a twenty year period and specifically to 
ensure that by 1990 the income disparity between the Malays and non-Malays was 
substantially reduced. The Malay share of all levels and types of employment was made 
to reflect the community’s share in the total population and the Malay stake in the 
ownership and control of all shares and types of economic enterprise was brought from 
its current negligible level up to 30 percent of the total. In 1991 the National 
Development Policy replaced the NEP. 
When normalcy returned, the NOC Chairman, Tun Abdul Razak, who was then 
elected the new Prime Minister, announced the return to democracy and the continuation 
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of the Parliamentary System in February 1971. Restoration of the constitutional 
government, however, was followed by the adoption of constitutional amendments 
prohibiting public discussion of “sensitive issues” that might cause civil unrest102. To 
maintain stability and peace, especially after such an emotional upheaval, chauvinistic 
feelings had to be contained with the expansion of the Sedition Act.  The Act prohibited 
the discussions of sensitive issues such as Malay rights, the Sultans, the Malay language 
and other such matters103. 
The government took various steps to enhance racial harmony, such as to 
establish a national ideology, the Rukunegara. In this ideology, people of all races were 
to advance together toward a just and progressive society through a belief in God, loyalty 
to King and country, the upholding of the constitution and rule of law, and the promotion 
of moral discipline, tolerance and mutual respect104. This surely was emulating 
Indonesia, a similar pluralist and diverse nation, where the state ideology of “Pantja Sila” 
was designed as an ideological foundation for rival political forces to live together under 
the same roof.  
To address the perceived lack of political say for the non-Malays, opposition 
political parties were invited to join the government. The political landscape was changed 
with the enlargement of the original three-party Alliance Coalition into a ten-party 
“National Front”. This new coalition consisted, amongst others, of the erstwhile 
opposition parties of Gerakan which was non-Malay based and had captured the state of 
Penang, PAS which was Islamic based and had captured Kelantan105, and the People’s 
Progressive Party, an Indian based party, and two East Malaysia non-Muslim based 
parties. Only the Democratic Action Party remained in opposition. When Parliament was 
reconvened in February 1971, the National Front cabinet that included new ministers 
from PAS and the Gerakan party took over the governance of Malaysia from the NOC. 
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The NEP was presented to Parliament by the new government and was endorsed after 
debates106.  
L. THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The country’s three decades of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity 
was shaken in 1997-1998 with the major economic downturn known as the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  This crisis also affected Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. 
Fortunately, with some sensible though controversial policy responses, Malaysia was able 
to emerge from the crisis fairly successfully. 
This is another important era, as it was a test of the efficiency of the NEP. Some 
NEP policies helped to cause the crisis, such as unbridled loans to inept Bumiputera 
businessmen who used the NEP to gain favorable treatment through political connections. 
The aftermath of the Asian Crisis laid bare some abuses of the NEP and the Malay 
community was torn asunder with charges of nepotism in the UMNO leadership by 
Anwar Ibrahim, heir apparent to Dr. Mahathir, who had fallen out of favor and was 
subsequently charged and found guilty of corruption and sexual misconduct.   
M. CONCLUSION 
British colonialism contributed to the ethnically heterogeneous population by 
allowing and encouraging immigration especially from China and India. By organizing 
the Indian immigrants to work the nascent public and plantation sectors, the Chinese in 
commerce and the tin mines and the Malays in agriculture and fishery, they started the 
close identification of race with economic functions. With the immigrants concentrated in 
towns and the Malays in rural areas, the ethnic groups were also geographically divided. 
Economic disparity began when the commercially better exposed immigrants had 
better access to business activities and education and thus were able to secure good jobs 
and build up commercial networks. They had a good head start and the government’s 
totally free market policy from 1957 to 1970 perpetuated this advantage. The ensuing 
Chinese hegemony in business networking ensured that they controlled commerce and 
industry making it difficult for new Malays to compete. The Malays, the majority of 
whom had been encouraged to remain farmers and fishermen and lacking in education 
and opportunities, did not advance economically or socially. They remained poor. The 
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landmark May 13th riots erupted when the Malays’ political hegemony was challenged 
and because they became aware of their wretched and unequal economic situation. They 
had used their political control to demand economic equality with the other races. It 
would not be appropriate to let only the Chinese and Indians reap the benefits of 
Malaysia’s success while the Malays remained poor and backward.  
The historical development of Malaysia is replete with compromise. The Malays 
compromised by accepting the Chinese and Indian immigrants as full citizens and 
brothers after independence although animosity had existed between them earlier. They 
were willing to share political power by forming alliances with these ethnic groups for a 
peaceful transition to an independent state from the British, or else the struggle might 
have turned bloody as occurred in Indonesia when they fought against the Dutch. Later, it 
was a compromise for peace after the May 13th racial riots, even though they could have 
taken advantage of their majority status in a democratic system and ruled alone as an 
entirely Malay government. The Chinese and Indian acceptance of the NEP is a 
compromise for peace, political power sharing and equity between the races. However, 
most of all, history teaches Malaysians to plan for their own destiny in their own way that 
will work for them.  
 
Nationality Population Presently Eligible by Eligible  
  Citizens Birth for  For naturalization 
   Registration  
   as citizens  
     
Malays 2, 803, 000 2,727,000  81,000 
Chinese 2,153,000 1,157,000 443,000 566,000 
Indians 666,000 222,000 168,000 243,000 
Others 84,000 33,000 36,000 21,000 
     
Total 5,706,000 4,139,000 647,000 911,000 
 
Table 2.   Citizenship Statistics, 1953. 
From: Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1953. (Kuala Lumpur: The Government Printers, 1958). pp. 5, 
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IV. THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY—SHARING OF WEALTH, 
OPPORTUNITY AND PROSPERITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, we discussed political power sharing and the social contracts 
between the races in post-independent Malaysia. In this chapter, we will discuss the 
sharing of economic wealth, opportunity and prosperity in Malaysia. Specifically, we will 
examine the reasoning behind the New Economic Policy (NEP), its implementation, 
progress and problems including the Malaysian financial crisis in 1997-98.  
The post-independence period should have been the time to implement the 
bargain of 1957. For thirteen years after independence, however, the economic situation 
did not change much and thus resulted in dissatisfaction, especially amongst the Malays, 
which ultimately led to the May 13, 1969 riots. Galvanized into action in its soul-
searching aftermath, the leadership reaffirmed and eventually actively implemented the 
Malay rights programs that were promulgated in the Constitution in 1957. These 
programs seemed to work, except for a break during the 1986-87 recession. Malaysia 
experienced unprecedented growth, stability and prosperity for nearly thirty years. The 
acid test of the policy’s efficacy and effectiveness came during the 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis. The country was battered by the ensuing internal turmoil due to economic 
and political developments. Though buffeted by economic chaos, the nation survived, 
without seeking help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Whereas there was 
inter-ethnic turmoil in Indonesia, there was relative calm in Malaysia107.  
The Asian Financial Crisis, nevertheless, brought to light many aspects of the 
NEP that needed to be reexamined. Externally, a new force called globalization has also 
put things in a different perspective, as it thrusts upon the people a new openness, 
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B. WHY THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY? 
In the last chapter we traced the historical developments that lead to the NEP. In 
our opinion, a few related reasons to be discussed below had guided to the leadership to 
formulate the NEP. 
1. The Malays’ Worsening Economic Situation 
The Malays’ euphoria over independence wore off after the first decade due to the 
minimal change in their status. Apart from replacing the British in the administration, the 
Malays had not seen significant gains in political or economic sectors. The Malays were 
still poor in comparison to the Chinese108. Having accepted the immigrants as equal 
partners through the ethnic “settlement” bargained for among the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians at the time of independence in 1957109, the Malays discovered that the ensuing 
stability had benefited Chinese economic activities the most, and continued Chinese 
economic dominance perpetuated the British era’s “separate and unequal” development 
of the three communities.110 During the 1960s, economic development not only 
maintained, but also increased income inequalities, including the income gaps within 
each major ethnic group in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Income distribution in Peninsular Malaysia111 worsened between 1957 and 1970, 
especially among the Malays.112  For example, in 1970, the poverty rate among the 
Malay households and other Bumiputera groups was the highest, at 65%, compared to the 
Chinese at only 26% and Indians at 39%. The Malays formed the majority of the poor, 
accounting for 74% of all poor households in Peninsular Malaysia113. These 
developments steadily widened the economic gap between the Malays, the Chinese and 
the Indians. The Malays began to condemn Chinese and Indian economic domination. A 
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decade into independence it became obvious that the indigenous people were not getting 
a fair share of the wealth.  
2. Ethnic Chinese Economic Dominance 
In a study conducted by Yuan-li Wu (1980) in 1970, ethnic Chinese enterprises 
accounted for 22.5% of the outstanding stocks of limited companies in West Malaysia, 
compared with 1.7% of the Malays, 61.7% of the foreigners and 14.9% for other 
Malaysian residents, including statutory bodies, the federal government and state 
governments. For corporate wealth, the proportion of relative Chinese corporate wealth in 
Malaysia in 1970 was 26.2% as compared to 0.9% for the Malays, 57.2% for foreigners, 
0.1% for Indians, and 15.6% for other residents. These figures are nearly similar to the 
statistics in Tables 2 and 3.  In addition, the Chinese, who constituted 36% of the 
population, were said to control 85% of the retail trade. The authors quoted government 
sources that the Chinese controlled 90% of the Malaysian economy at the beginning of 
the 1970s114.  
 
Ownership Amount Owned Percentage 
 Million, Ringgits(RM) (%) 
Individual Malay 168.7 2.6 
Trust Funds (Malay) 110.9 1.7 
Non- Malay 2233.2 34.0 
Foreign Nationals 4051.3 61.7 
TOTAL 6,564.1 100.00 
 
Table 3.   The Ownership of Corporate Wealth by Race, 1970. 
 
Race % In Poverty Average Household Income per Month 
 
   
Malay 64.80 $                 172.00 
   
Chinese 26.00 $                 394.00 
   
Indians 39.20 $                 304.00 
   
Others 44.80 $                 813.00 
 
Table 4.   Poverty By Racial Composition, Peninsular Malaysia, 1970. 
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The perception of the Chinese hegemony in business and commerce in Southeast 
Asia can be summarized in the June 4, 1974 issue of the Economist which stated: 
Fourteen million Overseas Chinese are the most formidable economic 
power in Asia outside Japan. Eighty five percent of them were born in the 
countries in which they now live. They have no territory of their own 
except Singapore, but they are united across many borders by a common 
language, culture and heritage. They operate economically rather like a 
huge multi-national corporation with its own conduct115. 
Many Malays believed Chinese economic hegemony to be responsible for Malay 
economic underdevelopment. For example, attempts to give some Malay agencies the 
opportunity at cigarette distribution were opposed by the Chinese, who responded by 
implementing an effective boycott116. Advertised job opportunities in Chinese controlled 
firms often cited fluency in Chinese as a criterion for employment, effectively shutting 
out Malay applicants117. These were examples of Chinese attempts to maintain their 
supremacy by actively cooperating amongst themselves to prevent new entrants from 
challenging them. Thus the government needed to actively intervene, so that those left 
behind could catch up. 
3. Challenges to the Malays’ Political Dominance 
The violent reaction to the non-Malays’ challenge to the political concept of 
power sharing and ethnic bargaining was the manifestation of more than a decade of the 
Malays’ frustrations. It was perceived in some quarters as reflecting a decrease in 
UMNO’s (United Malays National Organization Party), and hence, Malay’s, political 
hegemony118.   
Malay political control was agreed to in the “bargain of 1957”. In August 1965 
the Malays in Malaysia gave up Singapore, which was dominated by the Chinese partly 
due to the fears that Singapore’s overwhelmingly Chinese population would tilt the 
political balance against the Malays in elections. In Malaysia, the Chinese had already 
been conceded economic hegemony. Thus, maintaining political control in Malaysia was 
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a matter of utmost significance to the point of hysteria for the Malays. For the Malays, it 
was not only a matter of symbolism and psychology, but also a matter of political 
survival.  
4. Uneven Development in Peninsular Malaysia 
The largest contributing factor to dissatisfaction was uneven development, which 
followed racial lines. Due to many factors to be discussed later, from the time of 
independence in 1957 until 1970, the distribution of wealth, household income and 
participation in job sectors was lopsided. In the late 1960s, for example there was high 
unemployment amongst the educated, and especially so amongst the Malays. The 
unemployment rate amongst the latter was 25%. Also during this period, the 
concentration of Malays in the low productivity, agricultural sector was on the 
increase.119  
In essence, in the Malaysia of the 1960s, dualism existed. Particular races were 
generally identified with particular economic functions.  The unsettling fact of such 
dualism was substantial inequality. In addition to economic well being, the inequality 
could be linked to such areas such as occupation, geographical location, schooling and 
education opportunities, social mobility, size of the community and household 
composition.120 
Amongst the poor, 14% were urban dwellers, and 86% lived in rural areas.121  
The majority of rural dwellers were Malays. Of the country’s corporate wealth, as seen 
from ownership shares in registered business corporations, only about 2.6% belonged to 
the individual Malays and other indigenous races such as the Bumiputeras. Their 
breakdowns according to racial lines are shown Tables 2 and 3. 
Unevenness in income and wealth that happens along ethnic and religious lines in 
a plural society is a recipe for disaster; a time bomb waiting to explode. Poorer sections 
felt that the vicious cycle of poverty and helplessness were racial in intent. Resentment 
degenerates into very intense, emotional, and sometimes, violent ethnic struggles. We 
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believe this happens everywhere, with the Palestinians and Israelis in the occupied 
territories, in Bosnia and Sri Lanka to name a few. In Malaysia, it had resulted in the 
infamous May 13, 1969 racial riots, threatening the very foundation of peaceful 
Malaysia. Thus, the first major step to solving the problem is to transform unequal racial 
splits into national cohesiveness unity. 
C. REASONS FOR DISPARITY AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 
We argued earlier that the colonial policy was the general root cause contributing 
to the disparity and uneven development in Peninsular Malaysia. In this section we 
discuss how that occurred.  
1. Large Agricultural Sector for the Malays 
A major reason of the inequality in economic progress was the propensity of the 
Malays to engage in agriculture.  Despite the presence of the estate sector, which had 
high productivity, most agriculture households were engaged in low income, traditional 
activities with rice and rubber smallholdings. Malays, being the earlier settlers, owned 
most of the existing developed land and had generally stayed in the traditional areas of 
agriculture. The immigrant groups of the Chinese and Indians, having no landed property 
to start with, entered the sectors that proved to be more dynamic such as tin mining, 
agricultural estates, commerce and manufacturing.  
2. Urban-Rural Divide 
The burgeoning rubber and tin industries established townships and the immigrant 
Chinese and Indians embraced urbanization where opportunities abounded in education, 
commerce, small-scale industries and estate cultivation. The Malay landowners preferred 
the laid back lifestyle in the rural areas122 rather than the hustle and bustle, competitive 
environment in the towns, mines and plantations.  In urban areas where about a third of 
the total employment was to be found, the non-Malay share of jobs was almost 75%. 
British colonial policy reinforced this preference and kept the Malays separate from the 
modern sector. Representation of Malays in most economic sectors, particularly in 
managerial, professional and supervisory areas, was poor. Poverty remained very much a 
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rural problem. 88% of poor households were rural, and almost 60% of rural households 
were poor.123 
3. Pluralism and Multi-Ethnicity 
Many of Malaysia’s problems are believed to stem from the multi-ethnic and 
plural nature of its population. Out of Malaysia’s 20 million people in 1996, the 
Bumiputeras constituted 61% of the population, the Chinese 30% and the Indians 8%124. 
The remaining 1% was from minor groups. Racial differences were heightened because 
the different races believe in different religions. Of the indigenous Malays, the largest 
group is Muslims. The Chinese are Buddhists and the Indians are Hindus. To make 
matters worse, the races’ share of Malaysia’s wealth is also linked to their racial origins. 
The challenge is not class-based but religious-ethnic in characteristics. The cleavage is 
sufficiency profound to lead to genuine sense of difference125. 
As shown in Chapter III, the Malays and other indigenous races or Bumiputras 
had little choice in Malaysia’s pluralism because colonial masters brought in the 
immigrants. When it was time for self-rule and independence, pluralism was also forced 
upon them because Britain had insisted on converting the migrant Chinese and Indians 
into Malaysian citizens in exchange for independence for Malaysia.  The Chinese and 
Indians had also insisted on preserving their own culture, way of life and religions. Thus, 
Chinese and Indian schools exist side by side the national schools. These arrangements 
were part of the social contract on the eve of independence and promulgated into the 
Constitution. The Malays had to accept pluralism and live with it. Unfortunately, inter 
ethnic cooperation was lacking especially in business and commerce. Thus, the Chinese 
and Indians, with a head start in business, were able to control business and commerce 
and exclude new entrants such as the Malays by using clanship of the “Kongsis” or trade 
association networking. It was in their interest to remain in control, but those wishing to 
enter new fields would never be able to establish themselves and share the prosperity in 
trading and business.  The Chinese controlled small firms and a major part of the 
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country’s business matrix did not employ or train Malays or give them managerial 
appointments. 126Therefore, ethnic divisions persisted and unfortunately remained along 
economic lines. 
4. TNC Did Not Promote Evenness 
The transnational corporations (TNC) that helped in Malaysia’s countrywide 
industrialization program with foreign direct investments (FDI) rightly concentrated on 
profits, not social work such as providing better schools, health facilities or other social 
benefits to their factory workers. Providing amenities would cut into profits. Since most 
factory workers being Malays, working in factories only made the Malays’ economic 
plight marginally better, but did not enable them to catch up with the Chinese. Thus, 
promotion of labor-intensive industries did not contribute significantly in the Malays’ 
pursuit of economic parity with the non-Malays.  
5. Competitive Austerity Did Not Promote Evenness 
The race for FDI funds was a race of “competitive austerity”. Most developing 
countries try to promote their countries as a place of the cheapest source of 
manufacturing base. Thus, the government did not support policies to encourage wage 
increases, union assertiveness, or minimum wages, lest they lose their “competitiveness 
in austerity” and drive away potential foreign factory owners. Malaysia too, had fallen 
into this trap in its earlier years of its labor-intensive industrial push. With weak labor 
unions, wages and social benefits of the “have-nots” did not improve much. 
D. MEANS OF NEP IMPLEMENTATION  
The logic and arguments for the NEP were accepted by the political leadership 
and were apparently announced to create the socio-economic conditions for achieving 
‘national unity’ and  “nation building” through re-distributive policies.  The NEP had two 
overriding objectives, namely to ‘eradicate poverty’ regardless of race and to ‘restructure 
society’ to eliminate the identification of race with economic function.127  
The most important objective was poverty reduction as the poor are always the 
most disgruntled lot in any society. As seen earlier, the incidence of poverty in 1970 
amongst the Bumiputra was also the highest at 65 % compared to 26% for the Chinese 
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and 39% for the Indians. According to the Post Enumeration Survey of 1970, 78% of 
poor households were Malays. The mean household income among the Malay 
community was RM 41 per month, compared with RM 79 per month for the Indians and 
RM 86 per month for the Chinese.128 The largest numbers of poor households were in the 
rural areas where the poverty rate was 58.7%129. 
The goal was to reduce the official poverty level from 49.3% of all households in 
1970 to 16.7% in 1990.130 The plan was to reduce rural poverty to 23% by 1990 and in 
urban areas, to 9.1% from 21.3%. 
As to the first objective of eradication of poverty, the overall development 
strategy formulated emphasized export-oriented industrialization, and ambitious rural and 
urban development programs. Various long-range programs were created to reduce 
poverty amongst the entire population with an emphasis on the rural poor.  
The objectives of restructuring society were to reduce income imbalances among 
the major ethnic groups and between the urban and rural areas, to restructure the 
employment pattern at all levels and categories of occupation to reflect the ethnic 
composition of the population, and to restructure the pattern of ownership and control in 
the corporate sector so that Bumiputeras’ share equity will be raised from 2.5% to at least 
30%, with the non-Malays Malaysians’ share from 34.3% to 40% while the foreigners’ 
holdings would decline from 63.3% in 1970 to 30% in 1990.131 It also seeked to create 
and develop a viable Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community through its 
participation in modern commercial and industrial ventures132. 
The second objective targeted restructuring the composition of jobs and 
occupations in Malaysia to reflect the mixture of the ethnic components in all kinds of 
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occupations. For example, to address the lack of Bumiputras in business and commerce, 
the policy planned to establish Bumiputera share capital ownership in limited companies, 
and increasing the proportion of Bumiputera employed in manufacturing and in 
managerial positions133.  Policies were established to bring the Malays into the 
mainstream of business and commerce and education through a redistribution of accrual 
wealth and not the redistribution of already existing wealth. 
The policy needed to be expanded to cater to new programs to eradicate poverty 
and restructure society. The sources of funds had to come from accelerated growth in 
order to redistribute “newly acquired wealth”. The old approach of dependence on 
primary products of rubber and tin for economic resources were unsuitable and 
inadequate. Establishing import-substitution industries would not be adequate due to the 
nation’s small population. The government resorted to strategies such as export-oriented 
manufacturing, gas and petroleum industries, privatization of state industries and some 
strong authoritarian laws also. 
Accordingly, the NEP in the years after 1970 concentrated on aggressive anti-
poverty programs “and restructure of society” efforts by way of industrialization, capital 
investments for the poor, improving quality of life, education, skills training, direct aids 
to the hardcore poor, building Bumiputera entrepreneurship and management expertise.   
1. Manufacturing and Industrialization 
The most important factor underlying the reduction in poverty and increase in 
overall living standards in post-970 Malaysia were the growing opportunities for non-
agricultural work, particularly in the rapidly expanding export-oriented manufacturing 
industries. As an economy relying too heavily on agricultural products and primary 
commodity did not quickly lead to prosperity, Malaysia embarked on rapid 
industrialization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Generous tax policies encouraged 
foreign direct investments (FDI) but with better terms for the workers. When the 
Japanese and Americans multinational companies relocated their increasingly costly 
labor-intensive industries to Malaysia where labor was cheaper, the demand for unskilled 
ging about an overall reduction in poverty in the country.  labor raised real wages by brin
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The breakthrough from import substituting industries to the export of 
manufactures occurred with the establishment of free trade zones, first in Penang in 1970 
and then around Kuala Lumpur in 1971. In the 1970s, the Japanese and Americans were 
looking for alternatives to relocate their increasingly uncompetitive electronic assembly 
work relying on high cost labor at home. Malaysia was an attractive choice. It was 
politically stable, was a nice place for foreigners to live as one could even drink the tap 
water, and Malaysia welcomed foreign investment unlike Taiwan or South Korea134. 
Hence, the beginning of Malaysia’s highly profitable electronics assembly, and later, the 
manufacturing industries. 
However, starting in the mid-1980s, the proliferation of cheap labor-intensive 
industries necessitated a sizeable population of immigrant workers, especially from 
Indonesia, and Bangladesh, and thus creating new social problems. Again, the 
government readjusted policy to encourage capital-intensive enterprises that slowly 
phased out labor-intensive industries and emphasized the transfer of technology and high 
technology industry. 
The success of the electronics industry, flush with funds from booming 
commodity prices, and petroleum, helped lay the groundwork for a government led effort 
in the 1980s to change Malaysia’s industrial structure towards heavy industries in an 
attempt to "emulate Japan" as part of Prime Minister Mahathir's "Look East" policy. The 
government established the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) and 
other state bodies to go into partnership with foreign companies in setting up ventures in 
areas such as petrochemicals, iron and steel, cement, paper and pulp, and motor 
vehicles135.  
The government’s heavy industrialization projects, nevertheless, with the 
exception of Proton and PETRONAS, was not very successful. In fact, Perwaja Steel 
suffered massive losses and was a constant source of political embarrassment to the 
ruling National Front coalition. Heavy industries were supposed to accelerate the 
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restructure. The crux of the plan was a new cement plant (Kedah Cement), a new steel 
mill (Perwaja Steel), and an automobile plant (Proton Saga). These heavy industry 
projects were managed by a new state-owned corporation, HICOM, which undertook 
massive external borrowing to do so.  
These large external borrowing practices also contributed to the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. The blowout in public expenditures as a result of massive government 
investment programs was reflected in widening budget and current account deficits 
between 1981 and 1986. The macro imbalance was compounded by the terms of a 
decline in trade in the early 1980s and the subsequent world recession in the mid-1980s 
(Corden 1993,). The required cuts in government expenditures had invariable 
contractionary effects on the domestic economy. At the same time, the uncertainty in the 
policy environment was reflected in the stagnation of private investment, both local and 
foreign, in the economy. These factors brought the economic advances of the 1970s to a 
temporary halt and created an environment in which race relations became increasingly 
tense. In this volatile climate, the government clamped down on various opposition 
groups and embarked on a series of radical policy reforms136.  
2. Timber, Petroleum and Gas 
Malaysia had an unusually rich natural resource base on which to begin its 
restructuring, and just as the restructuring was underway, that resource base became even 
richer with the development of the offshore extraction of petroleum and natural gas, and 
petroleum and timber channeled large amounts of funds into government and private 
coffers.137 The newly formed oil company, Petroliam Nasional (PETRONAS), played an 
important role in funding ambitious plans to provide capital and loans to newly 
established entrepreneurs. In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, it was PETRONAS 
that was able to rescue many a Malay businessman from total collapse. The commodity 
price boom in the 1970s also helped, and Malaysia improved its oil palm output to 
become the largest producer of palm oil. 
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3. Increasing Women Workers 
In addition, the increase in the number of two-income households contributed to 
an increase in total household income for poor families. This was underpinned by the 
increasing importance of women in the work force. The labor force participation rate for 
women increased from 37.2% in 1970 to 46.7% in 1990, while the share of employed 
women increased from 31% to 35% during the same period of time.138 
4. Capital Investments 
The government set up a share-trust corporation named the Perbadan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB) that managed trust funds such as Amanah Saham Bumiputera (ASB) and 
Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) that purchased discounted Bumiputera –allocated shares 
in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) companies. Ordinary citizens could then 
buy shares in the ASN/ASB schemes to ensure the participation of citizens in corporate 
wealth and ownership. They share corporate profits through the dividends and capital 
gains. By 1994, 17.6% of KLSE stocks were held by these trust funds for Bumiputeras, 
up from 0% in 1970.139 
The poor, especially landless Malays, were lured to open new land schemes from 
the jungles that eventually earned them land titles to cultivate rubber, palm oil and other 
crops.  Farmers received subsidies in the form of cheaper fertilizers and grants in 
replanting old rubber/oil palms crops with better varieties. The government established 
agencies and corporations such as the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), 
MARA, National Trade Corporation (PERNAS) et al. whose duties were to plan and 
implement poverty eradication measures irrespective of race and were to concentrate on 
the rural poor.  
5. Quality of Rural Life 
The government also intensified efforts to improve the quality of life, especially 
in rural areas by upgrading the quality of basic amenities, housing, health, recreation and 
educational facilities; improving the distribution of income and narrowing income 
imbalances between and within ethnic groups, income groups, economic sectors, regions 
and states. 
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6. Redistribution of Employment Sectors 
The authorities took steps to stop identifying employment sectors by race. More 
Bumiputera students were accepted to study the sciences and professional courses so that 
they would be suitably employed as professionals or become businessmen. In order to 
create and develop a viable Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC), 
they would need to participate in modern commercial and industrial ventures140. It was 
done through employment restructuring, and ownership and control in the corporate 
sector. The government policy required companies to have the Bumiputeras represent at 
least 30% of the managerial as well as overall company personnel composition. As the 
number of non-Malays in government service, especially in the police, and the military 
were low, they were encouraged to join civil service, the police and military. 
7. Building Bumiputera Corporate Equity and Entrepreneurship 
One of the major strategies to accelerate Bumiputera participation in industry was 
the introduction of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975. The ICA required all 
enterprises with equity over a certain limit to sell 30% of their shares to Bumiputras. 
However, firms that exported over 80% of their output were not subjected to this 
requirement, thus ensuring that multinationals relocating to Malaysia, an important 
source of growth, were not alienated. None of the Kuala Lumpur and Penang electronics 
firms, therefore, felt any impact from the ICA141. 
8. Privatization and Public Enterprises 
One of the initial plans to help Bumiputeras in business was to establish public 
enterprises to help and guide them in business ventures, such as giving them sub-
contracts, and management advice, and also to create opportunities for employment for 
future Bumiputra managers and entrepreneurs. In time, the number of these public 
enterprises grew in size. In 1981, the value of investments of these state owned 
enterprises amounted to RM 2.527 billion or 27% of the total public sector 
investments142. These state business enterprises had the conflicting objectives of being a 
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redistributive tool and achieving profit maximization and efficiency. Not surprisingly, 
many of them did not do well, lack competitiveness, and were not profitable.143  
By the 1990s, a large number of Malaysians, including government leaders, had 
become increasingly disillusioned with state owned enterprises as vehicles for achieving 
both growth and social goals. Many of the state owned enterprises experienced sustained 
losses even though private enterprises in the same lines of business were doing well144.  
In the 1980s, also, there was a shift to more private sector oriented development 
and deregulations, encouraged by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and 
championed by Prime Minister Thatcher in Britain and President Reagan in the United 
States. The Malaysian government embraced the privatization concept first by 
corporatizing many formerly state–controlled enterprises, such as Malaysian Airlines, 
and privatizing new infrastructure projects such as the North-South Highway. It took the 
opportunity via the privatization exercises to implement the redistributive objectives of 
the NEP by selling controlling shares to selected Bumiputera businessmen to manage 
them. For example, PROTON, Malaysia Airlines, Malaysia International Shipping 
Corporation, the water board and telecommunications companies were sold to 
individually selected Bumiputeras or Bumiputrera controlled corporations.  
A major question from the outset was how to distribute the Bumiputra shares. 
Few Bumiputras had any experience with corporate shares, and the number with the 
money to buy them was equally small. The initial approach was for the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry to draw up a list of names to which the shares should be distributed. 
Typically, the chosen individuals bought the Bumiputra shares at a significant discount 
from the other shares in the same company. The entrepreneurs who received these shares, 
such as Yahya Ahmad, who took control of HICOM, and Tajuddin Ramli, who took 
control of MAS, were mainly Bumiputras and members of UMNO.145  
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Share allocation, therefore, became a vehicle for political patronage146. However, 
in his book, The Way Forward (1999), Dr Mahathir has this to say about the selection of 
share recipients: 
It was always believed that, if a company was run by a capable 
Bumiputera who had invested a substantial sum in the enterprise, the 
company would be better run and more profitable. The persons must have 
a proven track record, which indicated their ability to manage, and a good 
credit rating to ensure that the banks would lend them the substantial sum 
of money required to buy the blocks of shares.147  
It must be noted here that while the acquisition of assets by UMNO members 
strengthened their allegiance to the top ministers, it also rendered their support of the 
existing UMNO leadership disproportionately influenced by the state of the economy in 
general, and by the state of the stock market in particular. The root of the extraordinary 
economic and political developments during the 1997-8 financial crisis lies in this 
massive asset redistribution program. 
9. Improvement in Education  
Recognizing education as a means to better a society, the thrust in this direction 
was to educate the poorer portion of the population through better educational facilities, 
more scholarships, and reserved places in universities. To accommodate both Malay and 
non-Malay demands, Malaysia saw a proliferation of new universities and colleges, from 
just one in 1957, the University of Malaya, in Singapore, to 14 in 2001148. The quota 
systems ensured that public higher education opportunities were apportioned according to 
population ratio. The 1961 education Act and each of the 5-year Plans have sought to 
improve the education of the Malays and other indigenous races people by giving more 
attention to rural schools and the needy. This is an important step towards reducing 
income inequality for Malays.  
Thus the government implemented the NEP by economic and social measures. 
However, these planned measures must be agreeable to the majority for successful 
implementation. This agreement was obtained via the political aspects. 
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 E. ASPECTS OF POLITICAL POWER 
An important aspect of the implementation of the NEP was political power 
sharing between the races. The National Operations Council (NOC) proposed the NEP, 
and was endorsed by the UMNO, MCA, MIC and seven other parties. As explained in 
Chapter III, erstwhile ethnic based political opposition parties were invited to share 
power in the expanded government coalition. The original tri-party governing Alliance 
Party was expanded to ten parties called the National Front (NF) to bring aboard a broad 
mix of representations of all races in Malaysia. Partly due to the smaller remaining 
opposition parties, and their difficulties to reach the population through a government 
controlled mass media, the ruling National Front achieved successive successes in all 
general elections from 1972-1999, in turn ensuring that the NEP policies were carried out 
smoothly. 
1. Executive Dominance and Authoritarianism 
When the NOC proposed, and the reconvened Parliament endorsed, the NEP in 
1971 after two years of emergency rule, it also qualified total free speech by barring 
ethno-national messages and the assertion of state authority over the media, and created a 
very powerful Executive Branch. It was the Executive Branch’s domination that enabled 
the implementation and enforcement of key policies such as the NEP, which called for 
active state intervention to reduce inter-ethnic economy disparity, and privatization, 
which was started to roll back the state and trim inefficient state public sectors. 
Truncating democracy is always controversial and exposes the system to abuse. 
However, the government’s stand was that reducing democracy was the price for 
unhindered development. 
The government was not shy in using the stick. Thus, during the 1987 recession, 
when the political climate in the country was decidedly tense with opposing sides airing 
racially sensitive rhetoric publicly, the government clamped down hard and invoked the 
Internal Security Act to jail about 60 personalities for acts deemed prejudicial to racial 
harmony.  
Malaysian authorities have arrested dozens of suspected Jemaah Islamiah 
members and 50 members of Kumpulan Muhajiddin Malaysia (KMM) since August 
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2001, and are searching for about 200 more they believe are present in the region.  KMM 
seeks to establish an Islamic state composed of Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern 
Philippines.149 
These tough measures might not be conducive for liberal democracy, but they 
kept the peace and enabled the catching up process to be implemented smoothly.  Jack 
Snyder (2000) attributed to a strong Executive Branch that managed to save Malaysia 
from racial chaos, compared to Sri Lanka. He wrote:  
Malaysia has enjoyed 30 decades of extraordinary economic growth 
without serious ethnic violence…A key factor in this success is the power 
of Malaysian state administration over society.150  
F. SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF NEP? 
The NEP’s main goal was to foster national unity, through a more equitable 
redistribution of economic wealth, income and opportunity. In the process, it also 
strengthened the government’s hand via political power sharing among the ethnic groups, 
creating an overwhelming majority in Parliament. Based on measurable stated objectives, 
the NEP has achieved the desired goals. Although some localized disturbances occurred 
in 2001, and a near racial explosion in 1987, there were no recurrent racial riots on the 
scale seen in 1969.However, it also created a climate of illeberalism. Let us examine the 
success or failure of the policy by looking at some important areas, such as national unity 
and psyche, economic wealth along racial groups, Malaysia’s growth, economic 
performance and quality of life will now be examined.  
1. Overall Growth 
The economy achieved a large degree of restructuring, and growth continued at an 
annual average per capita rate of 6.7% per year over the NEP period. From 1987 until 
1997, it achieved an average annual GDP growth of more than 7%.  If per capita GNP 
(measured in Purchasing Power Parity) in Malaysia continues to grow at 4% per year, 
Malaysia by the year 2020 will have a per capita GNP nearly equal to that of the United 
States in 1993.151 Thus, by any reasonable measure, the NEP strategy is successful. 
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2. Wealth Creation and Poverty Eradication 
The success of the poverty eradication programs is evident from the sharp decline 
in poverty, which decreased from 49.3% in 1970, and to 15% in 1990, 6.1% in 1997 and 
to 7.5% in 1999152.  In absolute terms, the number of poor households dropped from 
791,800 in 1970 to 764,400 in 1976 and further to 483,300 in 1984, before rising slightly 
to 485,800 in 1987. Due to the implementation of the long-term measures, the impact of 
the 1997 financial crisis was minimal with poverty reaching 8.5% in 1998 and declining 
to 7.5% in 1999 as seen from the following graph. 






















Figure 2.   Percentage of Absolute Poverty, Malaysia. 
From: Malaysian Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, and Putra Jaya153   
 
The rapid economic development and substantial growth in income brought about 
a reduction in the incidence of poverty. There was a significant reduction in the level of 
poverty among all ethnic groups. Poor rural households had the most rapid growth in 
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incomes as they diversified their economic activities. Part of the gains in rural incomes 
came from productivity increases brought about by modernization, commercialization 
and technological improvement of smallholder agriculture and from more intensive 
farming. More significant gains, however, came from the structural changes in rural 
employment resulting in the diversification of the sources of rural income with non-
agricultural activities accounting for more than half of the income of rural households. In 
addition, the growth in the demand for non-agricultural labor encouraged large numbers 
of self-employed and unpaid family workers to enter the wage-labor market, making 
wage income a more important determinant of rural household income. The public sector 
programs for rural development such as education, rural roads and communications also 
contributed to higher participation rates especially among female labor, thus contributing 
to higher earning capacity among them. Rural households are therefore now less 
dependent on agricultural incomes as opportunities for non-agricultural employment 
become more readily available. 
Statistics suggest very impressive reductions in poverty in the 1970s and early 
1980s and 1990s. More significantly, it appears that per capita income levels have 
generally risen with growth. It could, however, have been further reduced, if more just 
and effective redistributive policies had been implemented, government waste 
minimized, and government allocations ostensibly for poverty eradication used 
effectively for reducing poverty instead of enriching politicians and contractors securing 
rural development projects154.  
There are, however, still pockets of poor Indians in the rubber estates. Despite the 
progress made in eradicating poverty, the inter-ethnic and rural-urban dimensions of 
poverty, however, continued to be of concern. Poverty was still highly concentrated 
within the traditional primary sectors and in the rural areas, especially in the rubber 
smallholders, padi farmers, coconut smallholders and fishermen and mostly amongst the 
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Malays155. From the regional perspective, high levels of poverty were recorded in the 
states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perak, Sabah and Sarawak.156 
3. Progress In Equity Sharing/Wealth Sharing 
In terms of growth rate, Bumiputera equity ownership grew by an average of 
29.1% per annum during 1970-1990 and 12.3% during 1990-2000. Although the 
Bumiputera have not achieved the 30% equity ownership target, the progress made was 
substantial. The Bumiputera share of ownership in the corporate sector rose sharply from 
2.4% in 1970 to 19.3% in 1990, 20.6% in 1995 and 19.3% in 1999157.  
The implementation of policies for increasing Bumiputera participation in the 
modern sectors of the economy during the NEP period has been generally successful in 
terms of achieving the quantitative targets. While efforts continued to be geared towards 
increasing Bumiputera ownership and participation in the corporate sector, the 30% target 
set under the NEP continued to guide the implementation of the equity restructuring 
programs during the NDP period. At the same time, emphasis was also placed on 
managerial and entrepreneurial development among the Bumiputera, as this was the least 
successful restructuring aspect of society.  
The fact is that the government has succeeded in creating a professional and 
entrepreneurial Bumiputra community that equals the non-bumiputra community in 
competence and competitiveness. By most indications, Malaysia now has a large, well-
educated Bumiputra middle-class that is actively engaged in nearly most industrial and 
modern service activities158. As a result of the further implementation of various 
programs under the NDP period, the Bumiputera's share of the corporate equity in 1999 
increased to about RM59,400 million or 19.1% of the total share capital in the corporate 
sector. As for the non-Bumiputera category, the Chinese owned 37.9% while the Indians 
owned 1.5%. At the same time, foreigners owned 32.7% and the nominee interest 
accounted for 7.9%.  
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4. Employments Restructuring and Education  
Bumiputera employment in the professional and technical category was also 
increased to about 63.8% in 2000. However, a larger number were in the sub-professional 
and technical worker as well as teacher and nurse occupational categories. In the 
professional category, Bumiputera accounted for only 44.3%. In the administrative and 
managerial category, the proportion of Bumiputera was 36.9%. In selected professional 
occupations, such as accountants, architects, engineers and lawyers, the proportion of 
Bumiputera increased from 20.7% in 1990 to 28.9% in 1999  
At the end of the New Economics Policy (NEP) period in 1990, public sector 
asset accumulation on behalf of the Bumiputeras, government regulation business 
opportunities and preferential policies for Bumiputera business had all helped to increase 
Bumiputera equity in the corporate sector. However, Bumiputera peasants still dominate 
agriculture. Poverty, though reduced, is still a grievance. The Chinese continue to 
dominate wholesale and retail trades, despite considerable inroads made by the 
Bumiputeras159.  
While the NEP presented quite a setback to the expansion of Chinese business 
interests, and while Chinese discontent was widespread, the overall economic position of 
the community did not suffer. Chinese entrepreneurs, particularly the wealthiest and most 
influential businessmen, prospered by forging strategic alliances with well-connected 
partners/patrons from the Malay power center. At the same time, the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO) leadership, faced with the country's worst recession 
since independence, pragmatically responded by liberalizing the NEP in the mid-1980s 
and implementing the growth-oriented National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991160. 
G. NEP CRITICS 
Undoubtedly, the NEP has done a tremendous job in atoning for past imbalances 
and ensuring a fairer distribution of wealth, income, employment and social benefits to 
the Malaysian society as a whole. Non-Malays benefited also, as their share of the 
country’s corporate wealth and business, and income levels also improved and there was 
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no widespread re-distribution of their existing wealth to the Bumiputera. However, critics 
of the NEP have claimed that the quota policy, excessive coddling of the Malays in 
business and education opportunities have made the Malays less competitive, and also the 
NEP causes resentment amongst the non-Malays.   
The cost of the reservation or quota system is that it often excludes the best 
persons for a job, business opportunity, a placement in universities or other benefits. If 
done pervasively and without regard, it will also affect the competitiveness of Malaysia 
as a country competing in the global markets. The Chinese and Indians naturally did not 
embrace the NEP whole-heartedly. Though most understand the reasons for the NEP, 
resentments from perceived unfair treatment occur. These negative factors also tore at the 
national fabric cohesiveness of Malaysians as a nation.  
Parceling out business opportunities under the privatization scheme to selected 
Malay personalities has resulted in charges of nepotism, favoritism and political 
patronage on the part of the ruling party and political leadership. The power to allocate 
rent-seeking projects that lie with the political leadership, if unfettered, tempts the culture 
of political patronage and corruption161. A culture of businessmen acquiring projects due 
to political patronage certainly places a damper on competitiveness and will not 
contribute to efficiency, export-oriented industrialization, and the technological 
upgrading desired for competitive development. The government’s bailing out of 
politically connected Bumiputera companies such as Tajuddin Ramli’s Malaysia Airlines 
in February 2001, and Halim Saad’s Renong Corporation in 1999 caused public uproar 
and foreign investors’ disapproval162.  
Too strong a concentration of power in the Executive Branch is worrisome due to 
the possibility of the abuse of power. In Malaysia this has led to patronage through the 
majority party163. The royalty, landed aristocrats and the newly rich businessmen, in 
wanting to perpetuate their wealth, will make use of political connections, using 
affirmative action as an excuse to grab the largesse in the name of the redistribution of 
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wealth and opportunities by becoming cohorts with non-Malays by acting as their silent 
proxies. Obtaining business opportunities and then turning over the management to the 
non-Malays in return for easy profits, or rent seeking without honest efforts, will 
undermine the policy’s good intentions.  
Authoritarianism and illebaralism have created a climate of fear amongst critics. 
The re is a sense of repressive-ness and Malaysia being perceived as unfair, with poor 
corporate governance. The trial of Anwar Ibrahim and subsequent internment tarnished 
Malaysia’s image internationally as the cases were widely considered unfair.164 
Thus, the most emotive political campaigns of the 1999 were the charges of 
government abuse and nepotism in the implementation of the NEP.  Then, the battle cry 
of the opposition parties was to curb abuses of power by abolishing cronyism, nepotism 
and corruption, which the government leadership vehemently denied 
The recent split in Malay unity was due to similar charges directed at the elites of 
UMNO, the royalty and the “new rich”. As a result, more Malays are gravitating to the 
opposition Islamic party to search for “honest leaders”, and solace in religion, perceiving 
the Islamic party leadership to be God fearing individuals able to deliver them. In time, 
there might exist a group of ultra conservatives fighting against the more liberal Malays, 
creating a much more alarming social split amongst the majority ethnic groups and 
amongst Malaysia as a whole. This is a significant concern in a pluralistic nation, given 
the troubles with resurging militancy attributed to certain of the Islamic groups such as 
Laskar Jihad in Indonesia. In fact, in July 2000, a militant Islamic group of about 30 
people calling itself the “Al Maunah” staged a weapons heist at an army armory in a 
remote part of Malaysia, hoping to initiate an armed struggle for an Islamic state165. In 
the process, they captured and killed two non-Malay security personnel. 
 Malaysia’s chosen path to directly address ethnic imbalances and remove ethnic 
identification by economic function by adopting a far-reaching policy will forever have 
its detractors, but the most important thing is that it addresses the main causes of the 
problems in Malaysia ethnic relations. Nevertheless, the above are fair criticisms and this 
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must be subsequently addressed because the NEP is based on consensus, goodwill and 
acceptance by all. 
However, Malaysians in general still supported the policies of Prime Minister 
Mahathir, as seen from the opposition’s failure to win the 1999 general elections. The 
government was again returned with more than two-thirds majority in the federal 
Parliament, though they lost the state of Trangganu and Kelantan to the Malay based 
Islamic party, PAS. 
The acid test for the NEP came in the wake of the Asian crisis in 1997-98 when it 
redeemed itself with the critics. There was relative calm in handling the racial situation in 
Malaysia during the recent recession caused by the currency devaluation and the collapse 
of the share market. The tension due to spiraling economic conditions failed to spark 
racial fights as they did elsewhere in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, a country 
composed of similar ethnicities. The street demonstrations that happened were due to the 
political support for the sacked Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, rather than an 
expression of inter-ethnic hatred. Though the crisis was a major jolt, Malaysia emerged 
relatively intact. 
H. THE ASIAN CRISIS  
Malaysia was one of the countries that were severely affected by the economic 
downturn. Its currency, and stock value took a freefall, shaking the very foundations of 
the economy and the banks and business corporations and the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE). In all, the country lost about 50 billion US Dollars in terms of 
purchasing power of imports and 150 billion US Dollars in market capitalization. 
It was another watershed in Malaysian economic development, and would 
inevitably have a far-reaching impact on its future social-economic reengineering policy. 
Fortunately, though the financial crisis had wide-ranging effects, particularly in terms of 
meeting the NEP, its successor National Development Policy’s (NDP) objectives, 
Malaysia has successfully avoided the extreme effects of the crisis such as large-scale 
unemployment, mass poverty, massive bankruptcies, and civil unrest experienced by 
others in the region.  
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1. Before the Crisis 
There are many favorable aspects to the Malaysian economy prior to the crisis in 
1997166. During the five years leading up to 1996, its real GDP growth averaged 8.7% 
per annum, inflation was low around 3.8%, and the unemployment rate for 1996 was only 
2.5%167. Unlike some other East Asian economies with high external debt, Malaysia has 
a relatively lower external debt of US$45.2 billion or 42% of the GDP in June 1997. The 
debt service ratio was only 6.1% of exports at the end of 1996. The banking sector was 
healthy, with non-performing loans (NPLs) at only 3.6% of total loans in June 1997. The 
nation’s saving rate of 38.5% in 1996 is one of the highest in the world.  
Although aggregate or macro numbers can sometimes mask some inefficiency in 
the case of neighboring countries, this was less so for the Malaysian economy. However, 
the nervousness of the market over some issues in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia 
and South Korea led to the ‘contagion’ effect that brought the economic crisis to 
Malaysia, resulting in gross under valuation of the exchange rate and collapse of the 
stock market.  
2. Causes of the Financial Crisis in Malaysia 
Two major causes have been attributed to the financial crisis: weakness in 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the openness of the capital account.168 
a. Openness of the Capital Market 
As already seen in Chile in 1981, and Mexico in 1995, opening the capital 
account has pitfalls. The inflow of short-term funds can quickly create an asset bubble. 
Once foreign capital inflows accumulated in the domestic financial system, small 
perturbations or shocks can quickly lead to a massive withdrawal of finance with a 
consequent deflation of asset prices, loss of investor confidence, increasing domestic 
bankruptcies, and a decrease in real activities169.  
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b. Weakness in Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
Reduction in the competitiveness of the Malaysian economy and 
competition from relatively “cheaper” countries such as China has resulted in erosion of 
its share in export markets and more competition for scarce foreign direct investment. 
Poor regulation of its financial system, as seen from the accumulation of poor assets 
bought by easy credit was another example. The policy of fixing the exchange rate of the 
ringgit with the American dollar also aggravated the problem. With the exchange rate 
risks absorbed by the central bank, higher interest rates in Malaysia had lured domestic 
companies to borrow from offshore markets rather than domestic ones. As a result, there 
was an unsustainable accumulation of short- term foreign indebtedness170. 
A close relationship between the political ruling elites and the business 
personalities, or “crony capitalism” as charged by detractors, exacerbated this crisis 
because of the need to support and encourage hard-hit Bumiputera entrepreneurs.  It was 
widely assumed that problems of cronyism, nepotism, lack of good corporate governance 
and transparency resulted in mediocre companies obtaining loans and contracts had also 
been attributed to exacerbating the crisis171. 
3. Tackling the Asian Economic Crisis 
To restore the economy the government set up the National Economic Action 
Council (NEAC) tasked with tackling issues such as strengthening the balance of 
payments, fiscal account, improving competitiveness, and seeking financial and monetary 
stability.  
Some of the steps taken to combat the problems were severe budget cuts for the 
1997 and 1998 fiscal years, import restraints, and limited opening of Bumiputera 
companies for non-Bumiputera control and ownerships and reforming the banking and 
corporate sectors to be more resilient. Price control was fully enforced to prevent undue 
inflation. 
Statutory reserves of banks, which stood at 13%, were reduced by 4% to improve 
banking liquidity. The government set up Danaharta, an asset management company to 
buy Non-Performing Loans in order to relieve the banks and help the companies turn 
                                                 
170 Amir Hashim (2000). pp. 14-20. 
171 Gomez and Jomo KS (1999) p. 186. 
63 
around. Another company, Danamodal, was tasked to help refinance banks and the 
mergers of banks and stock broking companies. 
a. Currency and Capital Controls 
However, the most controversial steps taken were the currency and capital 
control announced on 1st September 1998, before the sacking of the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. The Malaysian currency, the Ringgit was 
pegged to the US dollars at 3.88 Rinngits to 1 dollar. Capital invested in the KLSE was 
not allowed out of the country for a period of one year from date of purchase of shares. 
To stop the trade in of currency the local banks were instructed by the 
Central Bank not to transfer any foreign-owned Ringgit held by foreigners except during 
the first month of the control. Effectively this made the foreign-owned Ringgit worthless 
unless transferred to a local account in the first month. After that no more transfers would 
be allowed. 
Thus, money belonging to foreigners held in their accounts in domestic 
banks would be useless after one month if it were not already transferred. If it was 
transferred it meant that foreign owned Ringitts would have been repatriated and would 
be available for banks to lend. Billions of Ringgits were repatriated in this way. Once 
repatriated it could not be taken out of the country again as it would not be allowed to 
return. Taking the Riggit out of the country would render it useless, as it could not be 
legal tender in any other country, and no one would accept it in exchange for other 
currencies.  
This meant no Ringgits would be available outside the country for 
currency traders to borrow and sell. Trading in the Ringgit stopped and the government 
was then able to fix the exchange rate within the country. Anyone needing foreign 
currency to pay for imports could exchange their Ringgits for foreign currency at the 
Central Bank. On the other hand, if exporters earn foreign currency they could change it 
into Malaysian Ringgits at the government fixed rate at the Central Bank or any 
authorized bank. All the while the government would keep track of all incoming or 
outgoing money in whatever currency. 
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Had the government fixed a high rate for the Ringgit, exports would be 
costly and there would be a black market in foreign currencies. A low exchange rate 
would make imports more costly and result in inflation. The government selected a rate 
that was neither too high nor too low. 
Once the rate was fixed, businesses could operate without the uncertainties 
of fluctuating exchange rates and the need to hedge. The return of all the Ringgits from 
abroad meant the banks had plenty of money to tend. Interest rates could therefore be 
reduced without fear of traders devaluing the currency further. Businesses could borrow 
and repay loans. The rapid rise in non-performing loans was reversed.  
To recover fully, the slide in the price of shares also had to be stopped. 
Initially, the Government disallowed short selling on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
However, short selling continued as Singapore had opened a market in Malaysian shares 
without the consent of the Malaysian Government. They were able to continue short 
selling and consequently the share prices kept on dropping. As a result, Malaysian 
companies and bank were in distress as margin calls could not be met, and debts could 
not be paid. 
Malaysia had to stop the operation of the so-called Central Limit Order 
Book (CLOB) in Singapore in order to make currency control effective. To avoid 
reporting changes in ownership of shares through sales on the CLOB, all shares were 
registered in the name of nominee companies on the Malaysian Stock Exchange. The 
Malaysian authorities could not track the transactions on the CLOB and so short selling 
went on, depressing Malaysian share prices. To stop the CLOB they required all shares to 
be registered directly in the name of the substantive owner. Transactions not so registered 
would not be legally recognized. Nominees were not recognized. Trade on the CLOB 
stopped immediately and the Composite Index of the KLSE climbed rapidly. It was 
almost 50% higher than when the CLOB was operating. 
Malaysia also stopped the repatriation of proceeds from the sale of shares 
for one year. Thus, the possible massive withdrawal of capital from KLSE by foreign 
investors was stopped, which would have caused a severe plunge in the index, and a 
serious loss of market capitalization. 
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It was believed that when one year had passed, there would be a massive 
outflow of capital. However, that did not happen. The stock market remained sound and 
the banks and companies were released from the pressure of bad loans. Besides, the Asset 
Management Company and the bank re-capitalization exercise helped the banks and the 
companies to deal with non-performing loans. 
The efforts to revive the economy did not end with the stoppage of 
currency trading and short selling of shares. Numerous other steps were taken to restore 
the growth of the Malaysian economy. However, the most important steps were 
frustrating the currency traders and short selling on the CLOB.  
The selective control of capital flows was very effective. Foreign reserves 
increased rapidly, up to about 32 billion US Dollars compared with 20 billion when the 
controls started. The stock market index rose from 262 points on September 1st 1998 to 
over 800 that same day. Loans given out by banks picked up fairly well, vehicle and 
property sales increased, and infrastructure work began again. The contraction of the 
GDP was slowed and Malaysia achieved a growth rate of 4.1% in the 2nd quarter of 1998. 
4. The Merits and Demerits to the Malaysian Measures 
According to an IMF brief, Malaysia’s imposition of capital controls does not 
appear to have made a substantial difference, either positive or negative, to economic 
development so far.172 The stabilization of the currencies in the region and the relative 
under-valuation of the Ringgit, resulting in a large balance of payments surplus, have 
facilitated the implementation of these controls. Potential negative impacts of controls 
may have been subdued, given that when they were imposed, most of the capital flight 
had already abated, and the acceleration of regional recovery, together with progress in 
financial and corporate restructuring and generally sound macroeconomic management in 
Malaysia, helped bolster confidence. 
However, in the eyes of foreign capital-market investors, Malaysia had changed 
the rules in midstream. Thus, capital control caused a lot of damage in terms of their 
goodwill. This will be somewhat detrimental in the long term, as Malaysia still needs 
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foreign investors for growth in its capital markets. With this in mind, Malaysia lifted the 
ban in 2001. 
The current fixed rate of the Ringgit to the dollar (1USD= 3.8 Ringgits) was 
hurting Malaysia’s competitiveness with other ASEAN countries and China. Given that 
the country’s reduced productivity and competitiveness had in part contributed to the 
crisis, this matter must be carefully addressed. Also, if the dollar becomes much stronger 
in the future, it will be very expensive for the central bank to continue to maintain the 
fixed rate. However, abandoning the fix rate in haste will precipitate a serious lack of 
confidence in Malaysia’s policy stability amongst foreign investors. 
The call for structural reforms by the IMF by more transparent governance and 
regulating the financial institutions has strong merit. It is common knowledge in the 
country that loans were given based on political connections. The migration of a 
significant portion of UMNO’s supporters to the opposition coalition, led in spirit by ex- 
Deputy Premier Anwar Ibrahim, is a manifestation of their frustration with the state of 
affairs.  
5. Asian Crisis Effects 
The Asian Financial Crisis had two serious effects on Malaysia both economically 
and politically. The economic and social aspects were expected, but a more serious one, 
and unexpected, was political. 
a. Political 
The political effect was the disunity among the Malays after Dr. Mahathir, 
the Prime Minister, sacked the highly popular and equally charismatic Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim and the Finance Minister on 2 September 1998. Anwar was later 
charged in court and found guilty of corruption and sexual misconduct. His arrest did not 
sit well with his supporters and even less so when he was punched in the eye by then 
Malaysia’s Inspector General of Police.  
Apparently there was a power struggle between the country’s topmost 
leaders, Anwar, who was groomed for 16 years by Dr. Mahathir to take over the 
leadership of the country and the nation, and his mentor, Dr. Mahathir. The pressure of 
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responding to the crisis brought their different approaches to light. Anwar favored IMF 
policies and Dr. Mahathir did not. 
Anwar Ibrahim then charged his former boss and his advisors with 
practicing cronyism, nepotism and politics of patronage and claimed to fight to clean the 
country of these evils. However, it was difficult for Anwar to dissociate himself from the 
same sins if it were so as he was part of the leadership for nine years. 
The veracity of the charges not withstanding, it has split the Bumiputeras 
into two opposing camps and thus an intra-cleavage was created in Malay unity. 
However, in the subsequent general elections in 1999, Anwar’s forces failed to take over 
the nation’s governance with the incumbent winning a seat in Parliament with more than 
a two-thirds majority. Anwar Ibrahim’s ally, the PAS, won two Malay majority states, 
those of Kelantan and Trengganu. 
b. Threats to NEP 
Concerning economics, the attacks on Malaysia’s currency and share 
markets nevertheless damaged the carefully planned redistribution of economic wealth. 
The still young and feeble indigenous business community suffered the most. If the 
economy was not resuscitated quickly and put back on the path to growth, racial 
antagonism would return and Malaysia would be politically unstable. Political instability, 
in turn, would make economic revival difficult. 
While most of the indicators are positive, the economic turmoil 
precipitated by the crisis destroyed much of Malaysia’s achievement in correcting the 
imbalance between the economic performances of its multiracial population. While 
everyone was hit by the downturn, the indigenous businessmen were hit the hardest. The 
big corporations that they had successfully created were unable to withstand the burden 
of the debts they carried. The fall in profits and in share prices rendered many large 
Bumiputra conglomerates financially illiquid or insolvent. The decline in their share 
prices reduced the value of the collateral pledged against their bank loans, and the drop in 
profits caused by the economic slowdown made them unable to service their bank loans. 
They were forced to sell off to the non-indigenous people and this of 
course undid much of the redistribution the nation had achieved. The indigenous middle 
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class, small compared to the non-indigenous, practically disappeared. Once again, the 
indigenous people were found only among the low paid workers, hawkers and petty 
traders. 
The crisis had eroded much of the wealth redistribution. Malaysia has to 
almost start all over again and it is not going to be easy. The hard fought efforts at the 
redistribution of wealth had almost been wiped out overnight by the crisis. The crisis has 
exacerbated the danger of racial tensions, riots and consequent political instability 
recurring. The country has to resolve the economic problems caused by currency and 
share market devaluation without disturbing the delicate balance in terms of race 
relations. 
Other countries faced with economic turmoil quickly resorted to IMF help. 
Unfortunately the IMF wanted to use their loans to force through its so-called economic 
reforms. For IMF, affirmative action, active government intervention in the distribution 
of economic wealth between races was unacceptable. To them,the economy must be 
completely free of government interference and furthermore it must be open to total and 
unrestricted foreign participation. 
The result would be to deprive the indigenous people in particular of their 
share of the business sector and the wealth accruing from it. The Chinese, on the other 
hand, might still retain or even enhance their share. It was the recipe for the unraveling of 
the NEP. 
The IMF solution was therefore not for Malaysia. The country had to 
devise its own solution so that the government could continue with the eradication of 
poverty among all races and the elimination of the identification of race with economic 
function - the so-called New Economic Policy that had so successfully created a stable 
and prosperous Malaysia.  
The devaluation of the currency and the near collapse of the stock market 
placed the country in a very difficult position. If the currency were devalued further, the 
economy could be so weakened that Malaysia would have to turn to the IMF and accept 
its terms. Then 30 years of painstaking work on social-economic reengineering would be 
unraveled in a matter of weeks. 
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I. POST NEP 
The NEP ended in 1990 and continued with a more liberal National Development 
Policy (NDP) from 1991- 2000 and the National Vision Policy from 2001-2010. The 
ultimate objective is a Malaysia that is a fully developed country by the year 2020. The 
primary thrusts of the NDP entailed striking an optimum balance between the goals of 
economic growth and equity; ensuring balanced development of the major sectors of the 
economy; reducing and ultimately eliminating the social, economic and regional 
inequalities and imbalances; and ensuring material welfare while instilling positive social 
and spiritual values. The NDP also gave priority to human resource development; making 
science and technology an integral component of development planning; and ensuring the 
protection of the environment to maintain the long-term sustainability of the country’s 
development. 
While the NDP maintained the basic strategies of the New Economic Policy, it 
also introduced several new dimensions. The dimensions included shifting the focus of 
the anti-poverty strategy to address hardcore poverty; emphasizing on employment and 
the rapid development of an active Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
(BCIC) as a more effective strategy to increase the meaningful participation of 
Bumiputera in the modern economic sectors; relying more on the private sector to 
achieve the restructuring objective; and strengthening human resource development. 
National Vision Policy was planned for the period 2001-2010. The objectives of 
the distributional agenda will be re-emphasized through the National Vision Policy 
(NVP) to ensure balanced and equitable participation among and within ethnic groups as 
well as regions. The NVP will maintain the basic thrust of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) where the two-pronged strategy of poverty eradication irrespective of race and 
restructuring of society in the context of rapid growth will remain vital to achieve the 
overriding objective of national unity. The implementation of the NVP will also build 
upon the successes that were achieved in the past, particularly through the NEP and the 
National Development Policy (NDP)173. 
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Thus the basic thrust of the NEP will continue, but as the redistributive objectives 
are near the target levels, strategy for growth will have to be emphasized more. These 
continuation policies have ensured stability and favorable investment climate for 
Malaysia. Malaysia’s outlook can be summarized by the CIA 1999 country report on 
Malaysia’s economy overview:  
Malaysia made a quick economic recovery in 1999 from its worst 
recession since independence in 1957. GDP grew 5%, responding to a 
dynamic export sector, which grew over 10% and fiscal stimulus from 
higher government spending. The large export surplus has enabled the 
country to build up its already substantial financial reserves, to $31 billion 
at yearend 1999. This stable macroeconomic environment, in which both 
inflation and unemployment stand at 3% or less, has made possible the 
relaxation of most of the capital controls imposed by the government in 
1998 to counter the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Government and 
private forecasters expect Malaysia to continue this trend in 2000, 
predicting GDP to grow another 5% to 6%. While Malaysia's immediate 
economic horizon looks bright, its long-term prospects are clouded by the 
lack of reforms in the corporate sector, particularly those dealing with 
competitiveness and high corporate debt.174 
Three years ago, Malaysia’s lashing out with unorthodox measures has made the 
country an international financial pariah. However, as reported in the May 23rd, 2002 
issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) the situation has changed 
tremendously, as they reported: 
Apart from Korea, Malaysia could be the best-regulated and most 
transparent market in Asia right now.” Today, Malaysia's banks are among 
the best in the region. They have been recapitalized, consolidated to 10 
from 58 banks and financial institutions previously and have had their bad 
debts pruned to internationally acceptable levels. Danaharta, the asset-
management agency set up to resolve the bad-debt crisis in 1998, could 
become the first such global agency to turn a profit when it ceases 
operations in 2005. It took out 48 billion Ringgit ($12.6 billion) worth of 
bad loans at 45 cents on the dollar in 1999-2000 and expects to recover 
almost 60 cents on the dollar. The banks have received almost 9 billion 
Ringgit from Danaharta. In fact, China and Turkey recently sent teams to 
study the Malaysian debt-recovery model.175 
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Foreigners have ploughed $2 billion into the stock exchange, sending it 36% 
higher since May of last year. Growth could hit 6% this year, up from 0.4% in 2001 while 
tax revenues reached 24% of the GDP in 2001, among the highest figures in Asia. 
Meanwhile, Malaysia's sovereign ratings have been upgraded by every international 
agency, making the country's debt hugely saleable. Credit spreads on an upcoming jumbo 
bond by national oil corporation PETRONAS, considered quasi-sovereign, are expected 
to trade at around 175 basis points above U.S. Treasury Bonds. In 1998, similar bonds 
traded at almost junk levels.176 
With the depletion of surplus labor reserves, the major challenge currently facing 
the Malaysian economy is the upgrading of the workforce to create the resource base to 
enter world trade in high-tech, human capital-intensive, and competitive productions.  
J. GLOBALIZATION 
The Asian crisis saw a new force creating havoc to the unwary. It was called the 
Borderless World, or globalization. This new force ensures no nation can be isolated with 
its own set of special rules for itself. In fact, globalization supposedly brings with it its 
own unilateral only rule, and it centers on fast-paced competitiveness. Malaysia’s initial 
reaction was to shut off this force but later, the country modified its policies to 
accommodate the demands of globalization such as transparency and good corporate 
governance. 
Malaysia now aspires to become a fully developed economy by 2020. This 
dramatic economic transformation has occurred against a background of massive shifts in 
the world economy as a result of increasing internationalization of production and trade. 
Malaysia has shown it could position itself within this new world economic order. As a 
small-open economy, Malaysia's economic policy stance has been not to isolate itself 
from these global trends. Rather, it has tried to respond to developments on the 
international front as they unfolded.177 
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The NEP was a reaction to perceived injustice in Malaysian society, which was 
the impoverishment of the majority by circumstances they could not control mostly in the 
pre-independence period. A social contract amongst the races when independence was 
granted gave political legality to the migrant groups and economic hope to the indigenous 
people for equity in all aspects of freedom and prosperity. It was not a socialist revolution 
for seizing existing assets to redistribute amongst the poorer and less advanced in 
Malaysian society. It was about giving more chances and opportunities for the “have-
nots”, the ones left behind because of an unfavorable colonial policy, to catch up, rather 
than allowing perpetual lopsided opportunities to go to the already richer racial groups.  
Far from destroying Malaysia, the 1969 riots sparked a series of political changes 
that helped fuel the economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s. The country's economy is 
now driven by a multiracial partnership, with the politically dominant Malays and the 
economically powerful Chinese working in tandem within what is essentially a Malay-
dominated framework178. 
After the race riots or after the financial crisis it would have been easy to give a 
free hand to the very dynamic and business oriented non-indigenous Chinese Malaysian 
to develop and enrich the country. However, then, the indigenous people would remain 
poor and still feel deprived. They would be bitter and angry. Inevitably, they would rise 
against the people, whom they regard as foreigners, who had the most stolen wealth that 
rightly belongs to them. They would destroy the wealth which had been created, and the 
country would fail to develop. In the end, everyone would lose and the country would 
have to beg for foreign aid and accept the conditions imposed. 
The implementation of the NEP has undoubtedly changed the culture of the 
Malays and other Bumiputeras. They have acquired the culture of modern commercial 
and industrial society. The result of this change is that they have entered the mainstream 
of life in Malaysia. This has enabled the NEP largely to achieve its principle goals.179 
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Malaysia was lucky to have natural resources to fund NEP, but excellent efforts to 
attract FDI in the form of manufacturing industries, and a strong and powerful Executive 
Branch that can convey unpopular policies facilitated the NEP implementation. Liberal 
democracy was set aside for the loftier political stability and unfettered economic 
programs. 
The Asian financial crisis had nearly undone 30 years of the NEP’s hard work. 
However, the pragmatic response by authorities, at times relaxing the NEP, has enabled 
Malaysia to bounce back to a pre-crisis level. The Asian financial crisis was also a test 
case in the NEP’s efficacy, and despite destabilizing economic and political conditions, 
race relations in Malaysia remained stable and peaceful. 
An open economy and structural weakness in the economy caused the Asian crisis 
in Malaysia. The NEP, by facilitating large bank lending to inexperienced Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs, borrowing heavily to facilitate equity-sharing public enterprises might 
have worsened the situation. However, other countries that did not have an NEP to put 
them at a disadvantage also were caught in the financial crisis. Following the IMF 
proposals was not the solution for Malaysia, as it would have meant dismantling the NEP, 
which has proven to be successful.  
Malaysia’s growth has not been stunted because it had a political and social 
agenda intricately bound with the economic agenda as seen from the average 6.9 % 
annual growth for 30 years from the start of the NEP. As the Prime Minister said,  
We think we can continue to grow with equity by adhering to the 
objectives of our New Economic Policy, now that we have been able to 
defeat the attempt to destroy our economy and political independence by 
devaluing our currency and impoverishing us. 
Globalization brings competition and a market economy to accelerate and bring 
success to the borderless economy. It promotes preconditions for success by fostering the 
laissez-faire market. Yet Malaysia must not totally abandon the NEP policies that it used 
to successfully navigate itself for half a century, as the forces of instability in an 
ethnically based plural society are ever present. The country’s future depends on efforts 
to improve national integration, accelerate inequality reduction and unevenness across 
class and ethnicity and work towards growth, peace and prosperity. These are divergent 
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objectives but not impossible to manage, given the will, and from proven successful past 
experience.  
The key lesson to come from the Malaysian experience is that in a small open 
economy, the task of achieving the conflicting objectives of growth and equity is 
facilitated by a long-term commitment to an open and liberal trade and investment policy 
regime. Coupled with the stable political climate, the Malaysian economy can be well 
placed to take full advantage of the new opportunities arising from integration with the 
global economy.  
However, a note of caution on the political front—political oppression, patronage 
and corruption---which are also amongst the biggest danger for any country’s march 
towards developed nation status. Progress in the economic front must also be balanced in 
tandem by a more liberal political atmosphere, transparency and absolute zero tolerance 
on corruption, especially amongst those in power. Since the September 11 event in USA 
Malaysia has detained a total of 62 people believed to have terrorist links, including eight 
members of the main opposition Islamic Party. Though Washington seemed supportive of 
these moves, declaring that those detained posed genuine terrorist threats180, the use of 
ISA has been widely condemned internationally and domestically. ISA in the wrong 
hands can be a powerful weapon for political oppression, a development Malaysia do not 
need like the plague.  Detention without trial has outlived its purpose, creating a sense of 
oppressiveness amongst the populace, which can backfire in the form of protest votes in 
the elections, and also an unneeded blot to the nation’s credibility. 
Corruption and political patronage have been widely discussed in Malaysia. Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammad has shown that he is sensitive to such criticism, as it 
diminishes investor confidence. As remarked by an emerging markets guru Mark 
Mobius, who runs funds worth $12 billion for the Templeton group: ”investors worry 
about political stability, lack of corporate governance and cronyism”.181 It is heartening 
that the government has begun to shun dubious corporate bailouts as seen from its refusal 
to bail out TajuddinRamli’s TRI Industries recently. 
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While there were some policy excesses triggered by conflicting objectives in a 
plural society, the policy makers have been successful in rectifying policy errors swiftly. 
It was this flexibility and pragmatism, which put the Malaysian economy back on the 
path towards growth in the mid-1980s, and after the Asian crisis in late 1990s. The 1970s 
and early 1980s were created by the excessive emphasis placed on distributional 
objectives. In spite of the expected decrease in growth in the industrial world, the outlook 
for the Malaysian economy for the remaining years of the 2000s remains good. So long 
as the liberalization and deregulation of the domestic economy continues, the 
environment for private initiatives and enterprise as well as private savings and 
investments will continue to improve.  
Economic and social equitability is important, but so is growth. In the past thirty 
years prior to the Asian crisis, Malaysia has successfully towed the line. It has 
miraculously managed to achieve both hand in hand, thanks also to some trade offs 
between the races, and very autocratic laws. However, the financial crisis has shown 
significant structural macroeconomic weakness, such as the need for more 
competitiveness, transparency, and fairer regulations. This will make future social 
economic efforts for equal wealth distribution along the races more difficult, as 
meritocracy will have to be an important factor for competitiveness.  
Income inequality and redistribution can make an economy less efficient in the 
allocation of resources. However, left unchecked, it can foster dissatisfaction if the divide 
is across ethnic and religious groups, and it destabilizes, as had happened in numerous 
occasions. When this happens, economic growth will not be promoted.  
Malaysia’s efforts in that direction has shown some success but the country must 
look to the future and use the economic success to ensure the need to enforce economic 
and social parity between its diverse ethnicities which will truly transform the country 
into a fully competitive and stable country. Malaysia should not be developed only in the 
economic sense. It must be fully developed in terms of national unity and social-
cohesion, in terms of the economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, system of 
government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride and confidence. 
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V. IS NEP AN APPROPRIATE POLICY FOR MALAYSIA? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Without a doubt, the Government must address the worsening inequality, 
especially in wealth, income and social advancement, between the ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. The central question is whether the NEP was the appropriate policy for the 
country. Measured from Malaysia’s relative economic success, political stability and 
social harmony compared to other developing nations, it appears that the NEP was 
appropriate. However, just for the sake of argument, we will examine a scenario in which 
the NEP did not exist in Malaysia.  
It is impossible to envision Malaysia without the NEP during 1970-1990 but we 
can construe the scenario of continuing laissez-faire developments during 1957-1969. To 
obtain different perspectives on other methods of development we can also compare the 
policies adopted by neighboring countries such as Singapore, led by Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew after its 9 August 1965 independence and Indonesia, from the start of General 
Suharto’s “New Order” regime beginning 1 October 1966, as these countries faced 
similar economic and development challenges during the same period as the 
implementation of NEP in Malaysia.  
B. CONTINUATION OF 1957-1969 POLICIES 
As seen from the events culminating in the May 13, 1969 riots, continuing total 
free-market policies in the immediate post independent years in Malaysia would have 
perpetuated the disadvantageous situation of the Malays and the disparity would have 
grown over time. It would be increasingly difficult for the weaker group to catch up, as 
seen from the experience of South Africa after their independence from Britain182. In 
fact, the deteriorating position of the Black majority was a cause of apartheid, as the 
Blacks were so completely at the mercy of the White minority.183 The same situation 
happened in Zimbabwe. The former British immigrants continued their economic 
domination to the point where Prime Minister Robert Mugabe forcibly nationalized the 
                                                 




former immigrants’ properties, especially large farmlands, for redistribution to the poor 
indigenous population, leading to much chaos,184 and the expulsion of Zimbabwe from 
the British Commonwealth of Nations in 2002. 
C. SINGAPORE 
Singapore was asked to leave the Malaysian Federation on 9 August 1965 due 
partly to Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s opposition to the concept of special rights for Malays. In 
the years since, Singapore has successfully forged their own development concept, based 
amongst others, on competitiveness and meritocracy of their human resources. However, 
the PAP Government also practices authoritarian interventionist policies in their political, 
economic and social policies on development in Singapore. In fact, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew 
and Dr. Mahathir Mohammad are at the forefront with their arguments on interventionist 
policy, and that too much democracy hinders development.185 
1. History 
Sir Stanford Raffles of the British East India Company founded the Singapore 
settlement in early 1819, through an agreement with Malay Sultan Hussein Shah of the 
Johore Sultanate and the Temenggong (a local chief). Singapore at the time had around 
1,000 indigenous inhabitants, consisting of Malays as well as the Orang Laut, i.e., Sea 
Nomads. There were also some Chinese traders and gambier planters in the interior of the 
country186. 
Sir Stanford Raffles found Singapore’s geographical position was even better than 
that of the Riau islands near Indonesia. With its excellent harbor and plentiful supply of 
good drinking water, the island was suitable as a port. Most importantly, the new 
southern British port would be much nearer the main trading areas in the archipelago than 
Penang in the north of the Peninsula, being much nearer to Java and the eastern part of 
the Malay Archipelago. It could be a center of free trade to attract traders from all over 
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the archipelago. This would allow the British to begin to break the Dutch monopoly on 
trade187. 
Singapore proved to be a prized settlement. With the advent of the steamship in 
the mid-1860s and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Singapore became a major port 
of call for ships sailing between Europe and East Asia. Also, with the development of 
planting rubber, especially after the 1870s, it became the main sorting and export center 
in the world for rubber. For example, during the Indonesian confrontation from 1963-
1966, the Sumatra rubber industry collapsed for want of an export-processing center, as 
trade with Singapore was banned during that time.188. Before the end of the 19th century, 
Singapore was experiencing unprecedented prosperity.  The prosperity attracted 
immigrants from areas around the region. By 1860, the population had grown to 80,792. 
The Chinese accounted for 61.9% of that number; the Malays and Indians 13.5% and 
16.05% respectively; and others, including the Europeans, 8.5%.  
Singapore, together with Malacca and Penang, the two British settlements in the 
Malay Peninsula, became the Straits Settlements in 1826, and by 1832, Singapore had 
become the center of Government for the three areas. On 1 April 1946, Singapore became 
a Crown Colony.  Penang and Malacca became part of the Federation of Malaya in 1948.  
In the first political elections in Singapore, the Labor Front won and its leader, 
David Marshall, became Singapore's first Chief Minister on 6 April 1955, with a coalition 
Government consisting of his own Labor Front, the UMNO and the MCA. However, 
when Singapore gained self-governance in 1959, in the elections that year, the PAP won 
53.4% of the total votes and thus Mr. Lee Kuan Yew was sworn in on June 5, 1959 as 
Singapore's first Prime Minister. Singapore joined Malaysia on 16 September 1963 but 
parted ways on August 9, 1965. 
2. The Malays in Singapore 
As stated earlier, the Malays were amongst the original settlers in Singapore. The 
Chinese were descendants of immigrants from China and India.189  Nonetheless, since 
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the early 1900s, the Malays were a minority group in Singapore when the immigrant 
traders, laborers and commercial workers overwhelmed them. In the 1990 census, out of 
2.69 million people in Singapore, the Malays were 0.38 million, (14%) of the Singapore 
population, whereas the Chinese were 2.089 million (77.7%), and the Indians 0.191 
million (8%).190 
Politically, the Malays in Singapore were weak, compounded by Mr.Lee 
KuanYew’s policy to scatter and mix them with the majority Chinese populace. The 
Singapore Government broke up Malay settlements, in the guise of banishing ghettos, 
and dispersed them. As a result, there were no Malay majority political constituencies in 
Singapore. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew describes this in his book From Third World to First: 
As part of our long term plan to rebuild Singapore and rehouse everybody, 
we decided to scatter and mix Malays, Chinese, Indians, and all others 
alike and thus prevent them from congregating…Although we mixed the 
races by making them ballot for their homes, we found that they were 
collecting together again. …This forced us to in 1989 to put percentage 
limits of 25% for Malays, 13 % for Indians and other minorities at block 
level (resident-housing)191. 
Since Singapore and Malaysia shared the same fate under the British at the same 
time, the Malays in Singapore suffered the same predicament as the Malaysian Malays. 
They were backward and economically inferior to the Chinese and Indian immigrants. 
Nonetheless, no affirmative actions were taken in their favor. In fact, in some sectors, 
they were negatively discriminated against. For example, Malays were not allowed in 
sensitive military units such as the Air Force or armor units. Deputy Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong once had stated that in the event of a conflict, the Singapore Armed Forces 
(SAF) did not want any of its soldiers to be put in a difficult position where loyalty to the 
nation might conflict with emotions and religion.192 As far as this writer is aware, the 
SAF does not have a Malay with the rank of General. In a survey of all 24 Singapore 
officers studying at the Naval Postgraduate School, on 23 May 2002, none were Malays 
or Indians. Thus, there was a 0% representation out of 24 for non-Chinese Singaporeans. 
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3. Economics, Stability and Development 
By any measure, Singapore’s economy is a success. It attained the elite status of a 
NIC, a newly industrialized country. It is one of the four tiger economies in Asia. 
Singapore has improved its per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$ 400 in 
1959 to US$ 22,000 in 1999193. Singapore’s rapid growth has been described as an 
“economic miracle”. The size of the economy as measured by real GDP was nearly 
eleven times that in 1965, and its economy grew on average of 8.8 % annually for three 






71-80         81-90          1993 
Real GDP 11.9              9.1          7.1           9.9 
Inflation Rate 1.5              6.3          2.8           2.4 
Savings Ratio 17.2              29          41.5           47.5 
Investment Ratio 26.4             41.2          42.2           43.8 
Table 5.   Main Economic Indicator, Singapore.   
(From:  Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, 1994) 
 
In terms of stability, apart from growing pains, Singapore’s society was generally 
peaceful, with strict Government regulations. During the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-
1998, Singapore did not suffer many setbacks. 
4. Government Role 
Singapore is one of the most regulated city-states in the world, with the 
Government intervening in many aspects in economical, political and social areas. 
However, the interventionist measures are of “high quality”, very transparent with no hint 
of corruption194. Its public service and education system is based on meritocracy that 
attracts the brightest from Singapore and abroad. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, who ruled with an 
iron hand, guided its early years. He did not tolerate much dissent and Singapore has not 
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been categorized as a democratic country, though it has regular, transparent elections 
because the opposition was not given much leeway as the Government tightly controlled 
the press and broadcasting stations. For example, the UnionWorks’ Mandarin radio 
station has been fined Singapore$ 15,000.00 recently for adding “personal remarks and 
observations by the newsreader, which were unwarranted in normal news bulletins” as 
explained by the media watchdog Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA)195. As in 
Malaysia too, strict measures such as the Internal Security Act and Seditions Act exist. 
Singapore’s parliament has almost been a single party throughout its history since 
separating from Malaysia.  
D. INDONESIA 
The majority of Indonesia’s population of 224 million is Muslim Indonesian 
Pribumis (indigenous people), which accounts for 88% of the populace.  However, the 
Chinese, who number about 5 million, control the economy. No specific affirmative 
action policy exists for the poorer majority.  
1. History 
Indonesia, a collection of over a thousand islands, started out as a series of Hindu 
Kingdoms around 78 AD196. Like Malaysia, the Portuguese, Dutch, English and Japanese 
colonized it. However, unlike Malaysia or Singapore, its struggle for independence was 
through bloody and violent wars of revolution. On August 17, 1945, Sukarno, leader of 
the struggle for independence, proclaimed independence from the Dutch and become 
Indonesia’s first president. Sukarno’s authoritarian, “Guided Democracy” rule, was not a 
prosperous time for Indonesia. Embracing socialist ideologies of the Chinese Republic 
and the Soviet Union, Sukarno plunged the republic into economic stagnation. Though 
Sukarno was a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, he also was against the creation 
of Malaysia, and withdrew from the United Nations. 
a. The Communist Abortive Coup 
A defining point for Indonesia was the abortive communist coup by the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on 30 September 1965. The Armed Forces under 
Commander of the Army’s Strategic Command, however, Major General Suharto, then                                                  
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quickly crushed the uprising. This paved the way for the ouster of President Sukarno, and 
the rise of General Suharto to become the second Indonesian president who then 
embarked on his “new order” policies197. This new order regime persisted until Suharto’s 
resignation in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis in May 1998.       
b. President Suharto’s New Order 
To emerge from the political and economic legacy of Sukarno's Old 
Order, the new Government set out to complete the restoration of order and security and 
to establish political stability, carry out economic rehabilitation, prepare a plan for 
national development and execute it with an emphasis on economic development. Its 
detailed goals were: 
• To end confrontations and normalize diplomatic relations with Malaysia 
• To return to the United Nations, which Indonesia had left in January 1965 
• To consistently pursue an independent and active foreign policy 
• To resolve the West Irian question 
• To regain Indonesia’s economic credibility overseas 
• To hold general elections once every five years 
2. The Chinese in Indonesia 
In the 1970, it was estimated there were probably about 3 million Chinese in 
Indonesia amidst a population of 120 million198. Nevertheless, by the 1990s, most 
estimates placed Chinese ownership of domestic private corporate capital at around 70% 
of the total, and Chinese capital dominated the strategic large corporate sector199. Ethnic 
Chinese businessmen called Cukongs were able to link themselves to the ruling elites, the 
military and the Presidential family in order to corner the lucrative monopolies. Examples 
are Liem Sioe Liong in the clove monopoly to make Indonesian cigarettes, Yap Swie Kie 
in export/export and Bob Hassan in forestry and timber. Almost all Suharto family 
holdings were minority shares in mainly Chinese–owned corporate groups, notably those 
of Liem Sioe Liong, William Soerjadjaja, Agus Nursalim and Mukmin Ali.200 
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At the start of General Suharto’s “New Order” autocratic rule, the Chinese were 
very much at a disadvantage as they were accused of supporting the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), whose abortive 30 September 1966 coup in Jakarta had 
propelled General Suharto into power, eventually replacing President Sukarno as 
Indonesia’s strongman in 1967.  Also, the Chinese allegiance to the Republic was 
suspected by the indigenous Indonesians because of events occurring after the Indonesia 
gained independence in 1945 as many had identified themselves as Chinese citizens 
under China’s dual citizenship policy201. When the dual citizenship option was abrogated 
in the 1960s, the Chinese that remained in Indonesia were still suspected and many were 
officially termed “stateless persons”. After stability returned in the “new order”, the 
Chinese business community had to establish protection through friendships with elites 
and resorted to bribing underpaid public officials. This reinforced the notion amongst 
Indonesians of the Chinese as the corruptor of lowly paid Indonesians202. 
Veiled and not-so-veiled attacks on the patriotism of the ethnic Chinese have a 
long history in Indonesia and goes back to the Chinese role in the Dutch colonial period, 
and to the 1960s and the army's suspicion that the ethnic Chinese as a group were a fifth 
column for the Chinese Communist Party. They resonate strongly in Indonesian society, 
especially, though not exclusively, among more conservative Muslim groups.203       
The Suharto Government had continued a policy of discrimination against the 
ethnic Chinese, such as restricting their admission to state universities and civil service, 
maintaining a ban on the use of Chinese characters, and closing Chinese schools. The 
Chinese tried to assimilate by changing their names to Indonesian names, withdrawing 
from exclusive Chinese societies, and networking with the powerful military and 
bureaucrats204. President Suharto, at the same time, tolerated the Chinese dominance of 
the Indonesian economy, which enabled a few dozen ethnic Chinese families to amass 
                                                 
201 Mackie and Coppel (1976) p. 1. 
202 Ibid. p. 12. 
203 Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of Ethnic Chinese. http://www.hrw.org/press98/feb/indo-
al1.htm, 28 May 2002. 
204 Charles Coppel,(ed) The Chinese in Indonesia (1992) pp. 19-72. 
84 
fabulous wealth. These policies have resulted in the public considering the ethnic Chinese 
to be rich pariahs205.  
3. Political and Economic Performance 
Although industrial development at the beginning of the Suharto era was inward 
looking, state-run monopolies managed by bureaucrats and the military, oil exports and 
import substitution industry kept the economy growing206. The economy from 1970 until 
1997, for the period of Suharto’s regime before the financial crisis, achieved an enviable 
average annual economic growth of 7%.207 Relative autonomy of the political executive 
and the decisiveness of the political process had greatly facilitated the task of maintaining 
a generally sound macro-economic structure, as well as liberalizing trade, investment and 
financial regulations in the late 1980s208.  
At the same time, however, political relations between the state and capital and 
their corporate clients, began to conflict with the needs of capital for effective long-term 
state coordination to compete in world markets209.  Banks, following state directives, 
were overextended. Thus when the Asian crisis stuck, Indonesia was hit hard. 
In the political realm, Indonesia relied on the President’s authoritarian power. 
Although Indonesia has an institutionized party system and electoral process that holds, 
elections every five years, (in which only three chosen political parties are allowed to 
participate), they are extensively staged-managed and lean heavily in favor of the ruling 
party, the Golkar Party.210 The ability to make a decision is highly concentrated in the 
hands of the Executive, especially the President, who has wide ranging decree powers 
and can appoint members to the 1,000 member People’s Consultative Assembly. This 
assembly met once in five years in order to chose the President and Vice-President.211  
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The excessive unchecked power held by President Suharto generated a culture of 
nepotism and cronyism, was causing a serious economic-political issue, with those 
closest to the ruling family, such as the Suharto’s children, Pribumi businesses of high 
officials, and rich ethnic Chinese businessmen, obtaining the bulk of the business212. 
There was not much attempts to redistribute the wealth to the majority masses. In a feeble 
attempt to do so, on March 4, 1990 President Suharto invited thirty-one of the richest 
businessmen (almost all non-Pribumi) to his estate in Tapos in West Java for a highly 
publicized meeting at which he called on them to transfer shares in their enterprises to the 
cooperatives (generally poorer, Pribumi business efforts). The eventual outcome of this 
effort was modest213. Thus, when the Asian Financial Crisis struck, there was widespread 
discontent among the people and a revolt forced President Suharto to resign in disgrace. 
4. Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia 
In July of 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis beginning in Thailand descended on 
Indonesia, depreciating the rupiah and plunging the nation into economic chaos. Investors 
lost confidence and left the country. By the end of July 1998, the rupiah had fallen by 
about 65% relative to the end of 1997. The loss of confidence sparked financial 
instability, and output collapsed which severely impacted the poor214.  
Indonesia had to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rescue it from this 
crisis. On November 5, 1997, the authorities entered into a three-year stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF for US$ 10 billion, which was augmented by about US$ 1.4 
billion in July 1998. Large amounts were also pledged by other multilateral institutions 
($8 billion) and by bilateral donors ($18 billion), the so-called "second line of defense". 
Although the rupiah initially appreciated, market sentiment began to sour again, between 
December 1997 and January 1998, after sixteen insolvent banks were closed by Bank 
Indonesia in November215. 
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President Suharto’s delaying tactics towards reforms, and the ill advised IMF 
reform agenda made matters worse. There were also delays in implementing the program. 
The continuing serious social and political upheaval culminated in the fall of President 
Suharto in May 1998.  
Against this backdrop of fragile and incomplete accomplishments, the newly 
elected Government of President Habibie negotiated a new three-year extended 
arrangement for about US$ 5 billion with the IMF, which was approved by the Fund's 
Executive Board in February 2000. The macroeconomic framework seeks to restore an 
annual growth rate in the area of 5 to 6% by 2002, with an annual inflation target of 
below 5%. The Financial Sector Policy Committee was established with the mandate to 
provide leadership and direction in banking and corporate restructuring.216 
The rise in prices of basic goods such as rice and cooking oil has led to violent 
protests across Indonesia, most of them aimed at the ethnic Chinese minority who 
dominated the retail economy but also the shopkeepers who constituted a critical part of 
Indonesia's middle class.217 The rioting appeared to have been largely spontaneous, 
though Human Rights Watch believed that senior Government and military officials had 
fueled anti-Chinese sentiments218. Continued social problems forced President Habibie 
out.  His Vice President, Megawati Sukarnoputeri, a daughter of the former President 
Sukarno, replaced him. 
E. CONCLUSION 
All three countries followed almost similar economic policies of growth through 
direct foreign investment and industrialization, with Malaysia putting in place an 
additional redistributive policy of the NEP. All three countries have authoritarian rule 
though with different degrees of liberalism. Yet, eventually, after 30 years, their 
outcomes are different. 
Economically, Malaysia’s performance rating is between that of Indonesia and 
Singapore in most aspects of economic measures. Table 6 shows the progress on per 
                                                 
216 Ibid. 
217 Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of Ethnic Chinese, Human Rights Watch, Asia Division 
February 1998.  http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54b/064.html, dated 26 May 2002. 
218 http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/feb/indo-al1.htm, dated 27 May 2002. 
87 
capita GDP. Though Malaysia has progressed better than Indonesia, Malaysia lags far 
behind Singapore.  
Real GDP Per Capita in1995 Dollars 
 (a) (b) 
Country  1965 1995 
    
Singapore  2,678 23,350 
Malaysia  2271 9,458 
Indonesia  817 3,346 
 
Table 6.   Comparison of Per Capita GDP219. 
 
In the bitter test resulting from the Asian Financial crisis, Singapore was spared 
but Malaysia and Indonesia were not. However, Malaysia has managed to survive and 
recover, whilst Indonesia experienced the worst case of racial riots, and change of 
Government. While Malaysia and Singapore now have fully turned around, Indonesia has 
not. Thus, for countries not carrying out the NEP, their fate is very much different. 
Indonesia was mired in economic chaos and racial conflicts, whereas Singapore was a 
model of economic success. 
In the case of Singapore, there are special reasons why it is advanced and did not 
suffer racial problems though it does not have a redistributive policy to let the less 
privileged catch up.  
First, its Malay minority is weak and has no capacity to threaten the stability of 
the majority. Constituting 14% of the population, the Singapore Malays are politically 
dispersed through a policy of dilution by the majority Chinese in all constituencies.  
Second, being already advanced in trade and services, it had had a head start over 
Malaysia in economic development. Third, there is no doubt that the clean, transparent, 
merit-based administration has eradicated poverty, ensured investor’s confidence by 
bringing in more prosperity, which in turn makes everybody happy. Fourth, there are 
always the Government’s strict reprisals against racial agitation. 
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For Indonesia, there were calls, after the crisis, for the Government to install an 
NEP type policy220. The problem of discontent among the poor majority resulted in 
serious repercussions on the stability of Indonesia. However, the problem of its 
leadership, and especially President Suharto taking care of the interests of his family and 
cronies, has robbed the majority of Indonesians of a share of the nation’s wealth. In our 
view, Indonesia did not take advantage of the stability, prosperity and availability of oil 
money in the Suharto years to embark on a special program to help the poor Malay 
masses through similar programs such as the Malaysian New Economic Policy because 
the ruling elites were cozily cohabiting with the elite Chinese businessmen in pursuit of 
wealth and business opportunity.  
We conclude that the NEP has helped Malaysia stabilize the racial torrent and 
made the nation more resilient. After all, Singapore and Indonesia too have their own 
special policies catering for their own situation. The NEP did not drastically burden 
Malaysia as seen from its thirty years of relatively successful economic and social 
progress especially of the Malays. The policy could be further modified, however, to take 
cognizance of the latest developments such as the financial crisis in 1997-8. Malaysia has 
had to learn many lessons from the manner in which Indonesia and Singapore govern, by 














                                                 


























The situation in Malaysia today is radically different from the struggling 
underdeveloped country of more than thirty years ago at the onset of the NEP. Racial 
tension has been subdued to a great extent, and multi racial, pluralistic Malaysia has been 
able to build a prosperous nation. It has enjoyed more than thirty years of peace and 
prosperity with all races sharing the wealth and Malaysian governance. For most 
Malaysians in the 1990s, interethnic tolerance took on new meaning and greater value 
when compared with the ethnic warfare in the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc. 
Nationhood, the elusive state that defied the Alliance Party elites at the onset of 
independence, and national unity, which was the NEP’s overarching goal, seemed 
attainable221. This can be understood when things appeared to be quiet on Malaysia’s 
ethnic front on the eve of the July 1997 financial crisis. Despite other kinds of political 
conflicts, no major ethnic conflicts surfaced in the aftermath of the crisis. Malaysia is 
mentioned more and more as a model of racial harmony and cooperation in a multiracial 
society.222  
This chapter concludes the study of the NEP by analyzing the appropriateness of 
the NEP strategies from the results of thirty years of implementation, lessons learned 
from Malaysia’s nearly half a century struggle to define its national destiny and 
recommending the next steps Malaysia should take to modify its economic, political and 
social policies to build further resilience into the nation to face the challenges ahead. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The question raised when embarking on this study was whether the NEP was an 
appropriate policy for Malaysia. Was the policy successful? Should Malaysia continue it 
and what modifications are needed? The other question to answer was whether the policy 
was fair to Malaysians.  
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We conclude that the NEP was an appropriate policy for the country, because 
first, it saved Malaysia from a further escalation of racial and religious based civil wars as 
happened to many other post independent countries in the same period, such as Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan-Bangladesh to name a few.  
Second, the political and social stability created has become a magnet for direct 
foreign investment. By chance, NEP implementation coincided with certain 
developments in the global economy, such as the new international division of labor 
linked to the internationalization of manufacturing production. Japanese, American and 
European manufacturers came to Malaysia in droves due to the stability and the 
government’s concerted efforts to opt for growth to fund NEP strategies. The subsequent 
stability and NEP-mandated restructuring had also enabled Malaysia to develop its 
industrialization capability, and privatization management that it is well on its way to 
becoming an Asian Newly Industrialized Economy. The percentage of exports in 2001 
for manufactured goods was 85%.  
Third, the efficacy of the NEP resulted in an economic resilience in Malaysia that 
was strong enough so that, during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 1998, the 
economy managed to recover and the ethnic Chinese-Malaysians were not envied 
because of their overwhelming prosperity. Thus, they were unharmed in contrast to 
Indonesia where the same financial crisis led to an economic and political implosion that 
brought in its wake several outbursts of ethnic violence against the Chinese population, 
between Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku, and between Dayaks and 
Madurese in Kalimantan223.  
Fourth, the NEP has given a sense of self- worth to the Bumiputeras so they can 
progressively compete with non-Malays in Malaysia. Thus, when the government 
decided that admission for seats in public universities for academic year 2002 be based 
on academic merit, Bumiputera students managed to compete successfully, achieving 
admission figures greater than what they would have received under the quota system 224. 
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It is a far cry from the days of British colonialism when a Malay was to be educated, if at 
all,  
to make the son of a fisherman or peasant a more intelligent fisherman or 
peasant than his father had been, and a man whose education will enable 
him to understand how his own lot fits in with the scheme of life around 
him.225 
Fifth, though there was some controversy on use of the oil money, on the whole a 
lot of the PETRONAS revenue was spent on redistribution projects. The Malaysian 
leadership had not wasted the income by buying sophisticated weaponry, or building 
grandiose projects (Petronas Towers not withstanding), but had generally used them for 
development and restructuring of the Malaysian society through NEP plans. 
The data on the reduction of poverty and the restructuring of economic activities 
show that the targets are nearly attainable but not yet fully achievable as illustrated in 
Chapter IV. The NEP was generally regarded as a success though its targets were not 
fully achieved. Chowdhury (1997) argued that much of the success for Malaysia’s 
development was attributed to its racial composition at the time of independence and the 
subsequent pursuit of the NEP whose goal was racial and political harmony within the 
context of a growing economy. The success was in the “shared growth” enshrined in the 
NEP which was designed to balance the economic interests prevailing in racial groups.226 
Though the NEP from 1970-1990 was generally successful in its role in 
preventing inter-ethnic conflict, it was not without flaws. There were still areas that 
needed improvement. Certain adjustments were necessary to ensure that gains from the 
policy continued to maintain social and national cohesion. Post NEP from 1990 onwards 
has been a period of reflection for Malaysia. Some unintended consequences in the 
implementation of the NEP have raised concerns about intra-ethnic wealth distribution, 
the struggle for power and wealth opportunities between groups located in the ruling 
parties, especially in the UMNO. Political patronage has become a serious issue as the 
newly rich and aspiring capitalists jostled to obtain political favors, equating political 
ascendancy as a ticket to obtain rent seeking business opportunity. The need for strong 
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state control to be vigilant about political and ethnocentric disruptions is understandable 
but it is also causing illeberalism and limiting liberal democracy.  
In addition to delaying by a few years NEP achievements in restructuring and 
eradicating poverty, the Asian crisis also provided a chance to reflect on the country’s 
policies including the discretionary practice of the allocation of corporate shares to the 
connected Malays leading to charges of cronyism and a widening chasm of inequality 
within the Malay society itself. This has generated much discontent. The selective nature 
of the “bail out” process and procedures following the 1997-8 currency, financial and 
economic crisis have strengthened this resentment. Together with the political fall out of 
Anwar Ibrahim whose supporters have formed the Keadilan Party (Justice Party), a 
significant portion of the dissidents has joined forces with the Islamic party. This has split 
the Malay community. They have also launched the “reformasi” or reform movements 
demanding more transparency, a halt to perceived patronage, and a move towards more 
checks and balances. 
In answering the issue of whether the NEP was unfair, it is necessary to look at 
the historical development of the Malaysian nation. Malaysia emerged from colonial rule 
with its own unfairness towards the indigenous people.  The 1957 social contract between 
the racial leaders, agreeing to the need for the Malays to have special rights and policies 
to catch up economically had created the scenario for future development. The 
establishment of the NEP in 1971 was a manifestation of this agreement. In the first 
decade following independence, the government was too preoccupied with concerns 
about defense, security and law and order issues in the form of the communist armed 
insurgency, and Indonesian confrontations, and neglected this important social economic 
aspect, which led to racial and civil unrest. When looked at from the perspective of the 
1957 Bargain, the NEP was a fair policy meant to compensate for the magnanimity of the 
Malays, and allow them to share in a portion of the prosperity of their land. However, the 
Malays must be cognizant that this special treatment cannot last forever. It was meant to 
help them catch up and to compensate for the unfair disadvantages facing them earlier. 
Once equality is achieved, Malaysians must be prepared to renegotiate in order to build a 
very cohesive Malaysian entity.  
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The National Development Policy (NDP) and the National Vision Policy (NVP) 
for 1990-2010 address the continuation of the NEP. These two policies generally follow 
the NEP drive to eradicate of poverty and restructure society. The implementation of the 
NVP will also build upon the successes achieved in the past, particularly through the 
NEP and the National Development Policy (NDP)227. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The social restructuring, sharing of wealth, power and opportunities have so far 
given Malaysia thirty years of peace, harmony and stability. However, there are a few 
lessons and mistakes that Malaysia should take into consideration for the future.  
• The transformation of the Malay society has generated new “intraethnic” 
tensions and conflicts. The government must ensure that the wealth 
created be shared justly by the majority masses and the newly rich Malay 
businessmen-politicians elites. Distribution of opportunities must be 
transparent and fair. 
• The continuation of the spirit of the NEP is acceptable provided it does not 
continue indefinitely. Once the Bumiputeras are in as an equitable position 
as the non-Bumiputeras, the policy must be tapered and support should be 
formulated. 
• The ethnic division of labor that divides the society along intersecting 
ethnic and class lines must not be allowed to occur again. 
• The government should intensify efforts at national integration between 
the races so that Malaysian society will be less separated by race or 
religion. Excessive militancy of religious and racial inclinations must 
never be tolerated.  
• The education ministry should give priority to human resource 
development as an instrument to overcome inequality, especially studies in 
science, mathematics and English and professional courses  
• Malaysians must ensure that the new Bumiputra business class being 
created has acquired the right kind of experience to be able to match the 
earlier performances of the more successful Korean chaebols for example. 
These new holders of great wealth and hope of a Malay business 
community have to make the necessary transition to an industrial and 
international entrepreneurship. They must not be coddled and the 
government should let the best prevail. 
• The government should be mindful of globalization that demands 
competitiveness, meritocracy, and a reliance on market forces, 
innovativeness and flexibility in the business and commerce. It should 
ians of all races accordingly to face this new phenomenon. prepare Malays                                                 
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• The Malaysian Government must always be vigilant on efforts by any 
quarters to monopolize the economy, politics or education opportunities 
and be prepared to play the role of a strict but fair “referee” for a fair and 
well distributed share of wealth and opportunities 
D. CONCLUSION 
Malaysians have come a long way in determining their destiny. Its New 
Economic Policy has been controversial in its idea and implementation. However, 
Malaysia’s unique situation calls for unique solutions as it did during the financial crisis. 
The disparity of the races in Malaysia started with unequal opportunities afforded by the 
British, perpetuated by a harassed post-Independent government that had to cater to law 
and order, and internal security concerns. However, when the leaders realized their 
problems, they implemented the solution doggedly, despite some unorthodox methods 
such as state interventionist policies, “illiberal democracy” and a strong hand in 
maintaining law and order.  
The NEP was a reassertion of the 1957 ethnic bargaining between the races, 
promulgated in the Constitution, as quid pro quo for the Malays accepting the immigrants 
as citizens. It was meant to give the Bumiputeras time to catch up economically. 
However, in implementing the NEP, certain Bumiputera groups and non-Bumiputeras, 
also, have taken advantage of the redistributive opportunity for quick wealth via political 
connections. This situation has caused intra-ethnic splits, and should be eliminated by the 
government to ensure a fairer redistribution, which also must include most of the majority 
people. It should also ensure that only genuine, quality entrepreneurs be helped to push 
for a Bumiputera business class that is hoped will lead the to greater indigenous 
participation in commerce and industry.   
The key lesson learned from the Malaysian experience is that in a small open 
economy, the task of achieving the conflicting objectives of growth and equity is 
facilitated by a long-term commitment to open and liberal trade and an investment policy 
regime. Unlike many other developing countries, Malaysia never resorted to stringent 
quantitative trade restrictions. With this policy regime, coupled with the stable political 
climate, the Malaysian economy has been well situated to take full advantage of the new 
opportunities arising from integration with the global economy.  
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Malaysia has been successful in achieving its developmental objectives by 
adopting pragmatic policies in line with changes in the global economy. While there were 
some policy excesses triggered by conflicting objectives in a plural society, the policy 
makers have been successful in swiftly rectifying policy errors. It was this flexibility and 
pragmatism which put the Malaysian economy back on the growth track after the 
financial crisis in the mid 1990s, the recession in the mid-1980s, after the difficulties of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s created by an excessive emphasis placed on distributional 
objectives. The successor to the NEP, the NDP and NVP should also be able to guide 
Malaysia pragmatically towards liberalization, deregulation and competitiveness whilst 
maintaining a balanced growth for all its citizens. There is no doubt that if all Malaysians 
are united, they can achieve the vaulted dream of 2020228—i.e by the year 2020, 
Malaysia to be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian society, infused by strong 
moral and ethical values, living in a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, 
caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous, and in full 
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